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Unitariness and Independence: 
Solicitor General Control over 
Independent Agency Litigation 
Neal Devinst 
No.2 
With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of 
independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General 
control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent 
agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, 
Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice 
before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litiga-
tor to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control 
may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decisionmaking. In 
this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency 
litigation in the Supreme Court: so long as there are independent agencies, 
Congress should allow independent agency self-representation whenever 
the Solicitor General is unwilling to advocate the agency's interests. Thus, 
when disagreements between the Solicitor General and an independent 
agency are irreconcilable, the independent agency should be allowed to go 
its own way. The author concludes by connecting the issue of Solicitor 
General-independent agency relations to the larger debate over the unitary 
executive, arguing that the unitary executive is the only theory which sup-
ports Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation. In other 
Copyright © 1994 California Law Review, Inc. 
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words, to the extent that there is dissatisfaction with limiting Solicitor 
General control of Supreme Court litigation, that dissatisfaction speaks to 
the elimination of independent agency authority to reach decisions at odds 
with the executive. 
lNrR.ODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Policymaking by government officials who cannot be removed by the 
President appears to be a secure fixture in the modern administrative state. 
Reagan and Bush Administration efforts to subordinate independent agency 
heads to a unitary executive have clearly failed. 1 In contrast to such efforts, 
the Clinton Administration refuses to wave the banner of unitariness.2 
While much of the war over unitariness appears over, unitariness-
independence battles will nonetheless persist. This Article will focus on 
one of these battles, namely the battle for independent agency representa-
tion before the United States Supreme Court. 
An essential attribute of independent agency autonomy is an agency's • 
power to manage its own litigation and to represent itself in court. Before 
the Supreme Court, however, the Solictor General, with some notable 
exceptions, controls all aspects of independent agency litigation, including 
the power to seek certiorari. The exercise of such control, as one Solicitor 
General recognized, "to some extent curtail[s]" agency freedom "[d]espite 
the self-restraint which most Solicitors General exercise."3 
This Article examines implications of the tension between independent 
agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority to control independent 
agency litigation. Through an examination of court filings, legislative hear-
ings, and approximately fifty personal interviews with current and former 
officials of various independent agencies (commissioners, general counsel, 
and line attorneys),4 the Department of Justice (political appointees and 
1. See generally Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House's 
Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming April 1994); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 51 GEo. WASH. 
L. REV. 401 (1989); Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the lAw, IS CARDOZO L. REv. 21 
(1993). 
2. See Bill Clinton and Administrative lAw, ADMIN. L. NEws (ABNSection of Administmtivc 
Law and Regulatory Practice), Fall 1992, at I, 9. 
3. Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 
A.B.A. J. 154, 218 (1960). Stern served as Acting Solicitor General from 1952-1954. ld. at 156. 
4. Independent agency officials interviewed include the following: Glen Robinson, Former 
Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission (Aug. 20, 1992); Paul Gonson, Solicitor, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 2, 1992); Mark Fowler, Former Chairman, Federal 
Communications Commission (Sept. 3, 1992); Dan Goelzer, Former General Counsel, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Sept. 3, 1992); Jeff Lubbers, Research Director, Administmtive Conference of 
the United States (Sept. 3, 1992); Daniel Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal 
Communications Commission (Sept. 4, 1992); Bruce Fein, Former General Counsel, Federal 
Communications Commission (Sept. 9, 1992); Diane Kilory, Former General Counsel, Federal 
Communications Commission (Sept. 10, 1992); Charles Shanor, Former General Counsel, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Sept. 16, 1992); Paul Brenner, Attorney, Equal Employment 
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careerists within the Solicitor General's office, the Office of Legal Counsel, 
and the Attorney General's office),5 and congressional committees (counsel 
and staffers),6 this Article analyzes the complex interactions between 
independent agencies and the Solicitor General and proposes changes in the 
basic nature of those interactions. The interactions extend well beyond the 
resolution of litigation strategy disputes. They also speak to an independent 
agency's understanding of its freedom from Executive Branch control and 
the Solicitor General's perception of whose interests he should represent 
before the Supreme Court. 
The division of responsibility between independent agencies and the 
Solicitor General raises the spectre of a Solicitor General power grab of 
independent agency prerogatives. Despite the tension inherent in this rela-
tionship, independent agency officials and attorneys in the Solicitor 
General's office seem relatively content with the present arrangement. 
Agency officials tend to emphasize the benefits of the relationship with the 
Solicitor General attorneys: skillful representation; their familiarity with 
the Court; and their respect for, if not deference toward, agency interests. 
In exchange for these benefits, most agencies are willing to have their pri-
orities occasionally undervalued. 
Solicitor General attorneys likewise emphasize the quality of their rep-
resentation. Moreover, most of these attorneys perceive that the Solicitor 
General provides a unitary voice for the United States before the Supreme 
Opportunity Commission (Sept 22, 1992); Johnny J. Butler, Former Acting General Counsel, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Sept. 22, 1992); Peter Pitch, Former Chief of Staff, Federal 
Communications Commission (Sept. 22, 1992); Vince Blackwood, Attorney, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (Sept 23, 1992); Jerry Cummings, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade 
Commission (Oct. 8, 1992); Ernie Eisenstadt, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission 
(Oct. 8, 1992); Calvin Collier, Former Chairman and Former General Counsel, Federal Trade 
Commission (Oct. 9, 1992); Rosemary Collyer, Former General Counsel, National Labor Relations 
Board (Jan. 18, 1993); Norton Come, Head of National Labor Relatlons Board Supreme Court Litigation 
Division (Jan. 18, 1993). Through my work as a consultant to the U.S. Postal Service, I have also 
spoken with numerous agency officials and members of the Postal Service's Board of Governors about 
Department of Justice control of independent agency litigation. 
5. Department of Justice officials interviewed include the following: Ken Geller, Former Deputy 
Solicitor General (Sept 2, 1992); Carter Phillips, Former Assistant to the Solicitor General (Sept. 3, 
1992); Bruce Fein, Former Assistant to the Attorney General (Sept. 9, 1992); Douglas Kmiec, Former 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Sept. 10, 1992); Tom Merrill, Former Deputy 
Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992); Lawrence Wallace, Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 22, 1992); Terry 
Eastland, Former Assistant to the Attorney General (Sept. 23, 1992); John McGinnis, Former Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Sept. 23, 1992); Drew Days, Former Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division (Sept. 24, 1992); Mike Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division (Oct. 14, 1992). 
6. Congressional interviews include the following: Toni Cook, Staff Member-Communications, 
Senate Commerce Committee (June 2, 1992); Lisa Gursky, Telecommunications Policy Analyst, House 
Telecommunications Subcommittee (June 2, 1992); Gina Keeny, Staff Member-Communications, 
Senate Commerce Committee (June 9, 1992); Colin Crowell, Staff Member, House Telecommunications 
Subcommittee (Sept 25, 1992); Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Government, Congressional Research 
Service (Sept. 30, 1992); Mort Rosenberg, Senior Specialist in Law, Congressional Research Service 
(Sept 30, 1992). 
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Court and that this voice serves both the government and the Court. The 
government is served by having its legal arguments skillfully coordinated; 
the Court is served by having a trustworthy litigator explicate the govern-
ment's position and screen agency litigation for cases that are likely to meet 
the Court's standards for granting certiorari. 
While somewhat awkward, the current system does allow for a reason-
able degree of cooperation between independent agencies and the Solicitor 
General. Independent agencies typically have the final say in litigation 
until a case reaches the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Solicitor General 
usually defends the agency's position when a case is before the Supreme 
Court. When he does not, the agency is often allowed to present its views 
through separate filings. Indeed, even when the Solicitor General refuses to 
seek certiorari at an independent agency's behest, the agency will typically 
have the opportunity to relitigate the issue in another case. In such cases, 
Supreme Court adjudication is merely delayed, not foreclosed. 
The contentment that seemingly characterizes Solicitor General-
independent agency relations is somewhat surprising given the debate in 
recent years concerning the allegiance the Solicitor General owes the 
Executive Branch. Catalyzed by Solicitor General Charles Fried's July 
1985 "abortion brief'7 calling for the overturning of Roe v. Wade, 8 this 
debate pits advocates of an independent Solicitor General against propo-
nents of a unitary Department of Justice.9 This controversy, however, has 
not affected independent agency attitudes nor has it prompted Congress to 
reconsider Solicitor General control over independent agency litigation. 
Unfortunately, contentment with the current arrangement disguises its 
shortcomings. The claim that conflict between the Solicitor General and 
independent agencies rarely surfaces is misleading. On an agency-by-
agency basis, most conflicts are worked out. Nonetheless, the volume of 
public disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies is 
7. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84495). Fried served as 
Solicitor General from 1985-1989. The politics surrounding this brief are discussed in LINCOLN 
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JusnCE: THE SoucrroR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAw 135-54 (1987) nnd in 
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REvoLunoN-A FJRSTIIAND AccouNT 33-35 
(1991). For a critique of Fried's participation in abortion cases, see Joshua I. Schwartz, The President's 
Lawyer as Frie(n)d, 60 Goo. WASH. L. REv. 1081, 1119-24 (1992) (reviewing FRIED, supra). 
8. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
9. Compare, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 255-77 (arguing that the Reagan Administration's 
aggressive pursuit of its agenda compromised the Solicitor General's traditional independence and its 
special relationship with the Supreme Court) with John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The 
Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REv. 799, 801-09 
(1992) (reviewing FRIED, supra note 7) (describing the Solicitor General as a duty-bound subordinate of 
the White House) and Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DuKE LJ. 964 (reviewing 
CAPLAN, supra note 7) (critiquing Coplan's view that the Solictor General should ben servant of the 
Court and his view that the Reagan Administration eroded the Solicitor General's independence). See 
generally Symposium, The Role and Function of the United States Solicitor General, 21 Lov. L.A. L. 
REv. 1047 (1988). 
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far from insignificant. Substantive conflicts arise every year in cases 
argued before the Court. It is atypical but not unusual to see a Solicitor 
General brief that the affected agency refuses to join or an agency brief at 
odds with the ''Brief for the United States." More significantly, the 
Solicitor General will sometimes refuse to seek certiorari or will affirma-
tively oppose certiorari because he disagrees with an independent agency 
on the merits. 
Disputes are also understated because conflict resolution presupposes 
that independent agencies are well served by forgoing the power to present 
cases before the Supreme Court in order to benefit from the Solicitor 
General's counsel. By not allowing the agency to make the certiorari peti-
tion decision itself, the present arrangement often gives the Solicitor 
General the last word on judicial resolution of policy disputes between 
independent agencies and the Executive Branch. 10 The Solicitor General's 
power to trump independent agency desires and the conflict it creates are 
the starting points for analyzing Solicitor General-independent agency 
relations. 
The current decisionmaking arrangement might make sense if the 
Solicitor General were viewed as an independent advocate who, in the 
words of Solicitor General Francis Biddle (1940-1941), is "responsible 
neither to the man who appointed him nor to his immediate superior . . . 
[and has] no master to serve except his country."11 If the Solicitor General 
had such autonomy, Executive Branch entities as well as independent agen-
cies would give up control of Supreme Court litigation to an omniscient 
"Celestial General."12 However, like post-Watergate efforts to convert the 
Department of Justice into an independent agency, 13 such Solicitor General 
independence unconstitutionally infringes on the President's power to "take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'* 
10. On this point, see Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal 
Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 70, 86 (1984) ("Centralized litigating authority means the choice of 
the Attorney General [rather than the courts] .•. as the proper place for the resolution of such 
[governmental] conflicts."); Robert L. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HAR.v. L. 
REv. 759, 769 (1951) ("[D]etermination [of intragovernmental disputes] by the judiciary is often more 
satisfactory than an effort by the Department of Justice to force its own views on the disagreeing agency 
by refusing to present the agency's position to the courts."). 
11. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AtmlORITY 97-98 (1962). 
12. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 171 (noting that "Celestial General," a nickname coined by 
Justice Louis Brandeis, was "an emblem of the Solicitor General" until the onset of the Reagan 
Administration). 
13. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter 
Politics Hearings]. 
14. U.S. CoNST. art. n, § 3. Specifically, by placing control of all federal legal policymaking 
before the Supreme Court in an official outside of the Executive Branch, presidential authority would be 
so severely undermined that the president would impermissibly be deprived of his authority to 
"faithfully execute" the laws. 
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In addition, this vision reflects little of the reality and limitations of 
Solicitor General advocacy, including occasional efforts by the White 
House and the Attorney General to circumscribe the Solicitor General's 
authority. While he is "not the pamphleteer general," as Rex Lee (1981-
1985) aptly observed, the Solicitor General serves ''the President's broader 
agenda" through ''the special status that [he] enjoy[s]."15 The Solicitor 
General's "special status" derives neither from his independence nor from 
his supposed role as an officer of the Court. His "special status" is a by-
product of an often brilliant juggling act, rooted in tradition and a desire to 
maximize influence, which is responsive to the competing demands of the 
White House, agencies and departments, and the Supreme Court. However, 
the Solicitor General is the Executive Branch's advocate before the 
Supreme Court, and his loyalty properly belongs to the Attorney General 
and the President. 
Solicitor General power over independent agencies would also make 
sense if the government presented itself as a unitary concern before the 
judiciary. But, for several reasons, this is not the case. First, independent 
agencies often square off with each other and with the Department of 
Justice in the lower federal courts. Congress authorizes this arrangement, 
and federal judges seem untroubled by it. Second, Congress has granted 
some agencies independent authority to litigate cases before the Supreme 
Court free of Solicitor General control. In addition, the Solicitor General 
occasionally aJlows independent agencies, as well as executive departments 
and agencies, to file briefs opposing his views. Indeed, on rare occasions, 
the Court has adjudicated lawsuits by independent agencies against the 
United States. While the Court may not prefer this arrangement, it does not 
stand in the way of such divided presentations. 
For better or for worse, independent agencies are empowered to make 
policy at odds with White House priorities. To allow an Executive Branch 
official to control both the decision to seek certiorari and the arguments 
presented before the Supreme Court is to risk that power. Congress, of 
course, can solidify independent agency autonomy by extending independ-
ent agency litigating authority to Supreme Court matters. Alternatively, 
Congress may prefer that independent agency officials not air their disputes 
with each other and the Executive Branch in court. By making government 
litigation the Department of Justice's exclusive domain, Congress could 
nullify independent agency legal policymaking. 
This Article will argue that so long as there are independent agencies, 
Congress should expand independent agency litigating authority in most 
instances. Legal policymaking is a critical feature of independent agency 
decisionmaking; full control of litigating authority is, therefore, essential to 
independent agency autonomy. That authority should extend to the 
15. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 
595, 600 (1986). 
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Supreme Court. At the same time, the Solicitor General should continue to 
work with independent agency counsel, advising agencies on the "cert-wor-
thiness" of cases and participating in cases where the Solicitor General and 
the agency are of the same mind. When disagreements between the two are 
irreconcilable, an independent agency should be allowed to go its own way. 
The Solicitor General would not be harmed by this arrangement. In 
most cases, the independent agency would cooperate with the Solicitor 
General. When differences could not be reconciled, the Solicitor General 
would avoid the awkward position of either frustrating agency interests by 
not seeking certiorari or authorizing the agency to take a position at odds 
with the "United States." Moreover, when an independent agency chose to 
stake out its own position, the Solicitor General would be free to share his 
views with the Court without the encumbrance of shooting his putative cli-
ent in the foot. 
Finally, the Court would not be burdened by this expansion of 
independent agency litigating authority. It would continue to benefit from 
the Solicitor General's certiorari recommendations and substantive argu-
ments. Indeed, to ensure Solicitor General participation, Congress could 
make the Solicitor General a statutory litigant in all government litigation 
before the Supreme Court. The slight increase in dual filings that may 
result should not bother the Court since dual filings are already a well-
accepted practice. The Court is sufficiently sophisticated to sort out the 
varying interests of the Solicitor General and independent agencies. 
This analysis perhaps begs the question of whether we should have 
independent agencies. The more troubling one finds one part of the govern-
ment opposing another part of the government in court, the more likely one 
prefers independent agencies to be replaced by executive agencies, 16 and 
conversely, the less troubling, the less likely. By examining the complexi-
ties of independent litigating authority, this Article provides some guidance 
to the question of whether independent agencies should exist. 
16. Congress, nonetheless, may specify that executive agencies control their own cases, rather 
than having such control rest with the Department of Justice. Congress may also be able to authorize 
executive agencies to bring suit against other parts of the Executive Branch. See generally Michael 
Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 893 (1991) (arguing that disputes between executive agencies sometimes present justiciable 
controversies and that standards for measuring the justiciability of executive agency disputes should be 
the same as for disputes involving independent agencies). The range of such authority is subject to 
question. See infra Part II.C.l. It is also unclear whether government attorneys have an ethical duty to 
heed Attorney General desires. See Geoffery P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of 
Checks and Balances, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1293, 1298 (1987) [hereinafter Miller, Government Lawyers' 
Ethics] (supporting the premise that an agency attorney owes a general ethical duty to the Attorney 
General but arguing that the primary ethical duty is owed to the officer with the power of decision over 
an issue). However, it is clear that an individual who dislikes independent agencies is likely to prefer 
centralized control of government litigation in the hands of the Attorney General. See, e.g., Geoffery P. 
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REv. 41, 96-97 [hereinafter Miller, Independent Agencies] 
(attacking independent agencies as "anomalous institution[s] created without regard to the basic 
principle of separation of powers"). 
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The remainder of this Article will fill in the details of the argument 
outlined above. Part I will describe the jerry-rigged structure that defines 
the respective litigating authority of independent agencies and the 
Department of Justice. Part II will examine the saliency of Solicitor 
General control of governmental litigation. Specifically, the Solicitor 
General's responsibility to the Executive Branch and the risk of significant 
disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies suggest 
that such control significantly limits independent agency autonomy. The 
virtues of Solicitor General representation do not ameliorate these 
problems; instead, these virtues speak to Solicitor General participation 
in-not control of-independent agency litigation. Finally, Part ill will 
connect the issue of Solicitor General-independent agency relations to the 
larger debate over the unitary executive. Specifically, Part ill will argue 
that the unitary executive is the only theory which truly supports Solicitor 
General control of independent agency litigation. 
I 
GoVERNMENT ADvocAcY BEFORE THE SUPREME CouRT 
The government does not always speak as a single voice before the 
Supreme Court. Cabinet-level departments and executive agencies some-
times air their disputes with each other, Congress, and independent agencies 
before the Supreme Court. Conflicts inevitably arise among these players. 
Congress, especially during times of divided government, cannot reason-
ably expect the Executive Branch to defend vigorously all legislative priori-
ties in court. Intramural disputes within the Executive Branch are also 
commonplace. Department and executive agency heads, while appointed 
and subject to removal by a "unitary" President, rarely fall in line uniformly 
with White House attempts to coordinate a centralized vision of the 
President's public policy objectivesP These individuals have different 
visions of the social good, serve different constituency interests, and labor 
under different oversight committees. Independent agencies are even more 
prone to find themselves in the midst of conflict. Aside from facing vary-
ing constituency interests and oversight committee pressures, agency com-
missioners, who can only be fired for cause, are sometimes members of a 
different political party than the President and are often appointed by the 
sitting President's predecessor.18 
While the existence of conflicts and disputes is not surprising, the vol-
ume of intragovernmental disputes that are publicly aired before the federal 
17. See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MicH. L. REv. 1723, 1749-63 (1991) (reviewing 
HuGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (1990)) (discussing political and institutional obstacles that 
limit the President's ability to control agencies in seeking coordinated policy strategies). 
18. For background discussion of intragovernmental constraints facing independent agencies, sec 
PETER L. STRAuss, AN INrRooucnoN TO ADMINISTRATIVE JuSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 51-92 
(1989); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Y ALB LJ. 451 (1979). 
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courts, including the Supreme Court, is noteworthy. Through a combina-
tion of politics, comity, and statutory right, the government often appears as 
a conglomeration of competing interests rather than a single, unified voice. 
This is evident in the following passage from Carter Attorney General 
Griffin Bell's oral argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: 19 
ATIORNEY GENERAL BELL: ... 
In this unusual case, as Attorney General I agreed that the 
Secretary of Interior could take a position opposite our position in 
this Court. 
QUESTION: Mr. Attorney General, with regard to your 
statement a moment ago about other agencies of the Government 
taking their own position here [supporting the Department of 
Commerce and the Tennessee Valley Authority] contrary to what 
the Solicitor General might be, I indicated that Congress has 
expressly authorized it in some instances. 
ATIORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right. 
QUESTION: And I just suggested that this afternoon or 
tomorrow we're hearing a case in which the Federal 
Communications Commission is taking a position flatly contrary to 
the Department of Justice on a case. It's not a rarity. 
"Unusual" but "not a rarity"-that is the best way to describe intragovern-
mental conflict before the federal courts. 
A. Attorney General Control of Government Litigation 
The Attorney General's authority to manage government litigation is 
the norm, not the exception. Congress has specified that, "[e]xcept as 
otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United 
States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing 
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under 
the direction of the Attorney General."20 In principle, this hierarchical 
structure places the Attorney General, who answers only to the President, 
above all government litigants both within and outside the Department of 
Justice. The White House and Department of Justice endorse this concep-
tion of the Attorney General's role because it enables the government to 
speak as a unified voice in court, and it places the President or his Cabinet-
level surrogate, the Attorney General, in charge of that voice. The realities 
of Attorney General control, however, diverge from this hierarchical 
scheme. Congress' power to make exceptions to Department of Justice 
19. Oral Argument Transcript at 3, 32-33, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) 
(No. 76-1701). 
20. 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1988). 
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control has severely eaten into the Attorney General's role as chief litigator 
for the United States. Through these exceptions, Congress protects its pre-
rogatives from Department of Justice centralization by transferring litigat-
ing authority to an agency or department that is more likely to endorse 
congressional preferences. 
Legislative grants of independent litigating authority ensure that a sig-
nificant number of intragovernmental disputes are publicly aired before the 
federal courts. Congressional exceptions to Department of Justice control, 
moreover,-lack a coherent pattern.21 Some entities, including the Federal 
Election Commission,22 the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel,23 and special 
prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in Government Act,24 have 
independent litigating authority on all matters before all courts; other enti-
ties (e.g., the Department of Agriculture, 25 the Federal Trade 
Commission26) can litigate independently before all courts but only on 
some matters. A second group of entities has litigating authority that 
extends only to some courts, either on all matters (e.g., the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,27 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,28 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,29 the Internal 
Revenue Service,30) or some matters only (e.g., the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,31 the Department of Health and Human Services32). Other 
entities have independent litigating authority on some matters before all 
courts and on other matters before some courts (e.g., the Federal Communi-
cations Commission,33 the Federal Maritime Commission34). Finally, 
ambiguities in statutory language make unclear both the scope and sweep of 
independent litigating authority for entities such as the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice,35 the National Labor Relations Board,36 and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.37 Intragovernmental conflict, therefore, manifests itself in 
countless different forms depending on the issue and the court. 
21. See Olson, supra note 10, at 73 n.12 (listing 35 federal entities that possessed some modicum 
of independent litigating authority in 1982). 
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c{f)(4), 437d(a)(6), {b) (1988); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a), 9040(a) (1988). 
23. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288c, 288d, 288f (1988). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1988). 
25. 7 U.S.C. § 228a (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988). 
26. 15 u.s.c. §56 (1988). 
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), {e) (1988). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4{b), -5(f)(1), -5(f)(2), -S(i), -6 (1988). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 717s (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. 717l(i) (1988). 
30. 26 u.s.c. § 7452 (1988) 
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e)(2)(a), (f)(3)(a)(ii), 2606(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1366 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9{f), 7605(a) (1988). 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 405(1) (1988). 
33. 47 u.s.c. § 154(f)(l) (1988). 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(k) (1988). 
35. 39 u.s.c. §§ 409(d), 3628 (I988). 
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 155, 1600), (I), 161(2) (1988). 
37. For a discussion of TV A litigating authority, see infra note 104. 
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1. From Decentralization Towards Centralization 
The patchwork nature of governmental representation dates back to the 
nation's beginnings.38 Before the Department of Justice was established in 
1870, the Attorney General's role was to advise the President and Cabinet 
officers and to represent the United States in the Supreme Court.39 
Government litigation was principally the province of solicitors who 
directly or through retained outside counsel represented executive depart-
ments and agencies in court.40 This decentralized scheme, while giving 
way somewhat to the Department of Justice after its organization in 1870, 
persisted because departmental solicitors continued to wield enormous 
power through custom and/or statutory authorization.41 
In 1933, a centralized Department of Justice began to wrestle control 
from departmental solicitors. That year, President Roosevelt issued 
an executive order placing control of governmental litigation in the 
Department of Justice.42 The executive order was a mixed success. 
Congressional action empowering governmental departments and agencies, 
as well as agency efforts to side-step the executive order, limited its effec-
tiveness.43 In 1955, the Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) again called for the 
recognition of the Department of Justice "as the chief law office of the 
Government."44 Congress instead authorized decentralization by providing 
independent agencies as well as executive departments and agencies with 
independent litigating authority.45 
38. For histories of Department of Justice litigating authority, see Olson, supra note 10, at 75-78; 
see also DoNALD L. HoROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GoVERNMENr LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND 
Juorc!AL DECrsroNs 12-20 (1977); LtrrnER A. HuSTON, THE DEPARTMENr oF JuSTICE (1967); DANIEL J. 
MEADOR, THE PREsiDENT, 11iE ATIORNEY GENERAL, AND 11iE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 4-24 (1980); 
John F. Davis, Department of Justice Control of Agency Litigation 1-17 (Aug. 14, 1975) (unpublished 
report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States) (focusing on civil litigation). 
39. See MEADoR, supra note 38, at 6; Olson, supra note 10, at 75. 
40. See MEADoR, supra note 38, at 7-9. 
41. In fact, at frrst, Department of Justice attorneys both came from and continued to be housed in 
the offices of the executive department and agency Solicitors. See Davis, supra note 38, at 4. By 1913, 
moreover, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury all 
maintained separate Solicitor's offices. See id. 
42. Section 5 of the executive order transferred to the Department of Justice "[t]he function[] of 
prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and demands by, or offenses against the 
Government of the United States." Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901 
(1988). 
43. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 201, 56 Stat. 23, 29 (granting 
independent litigating authority to attorneys appointed under § 201) (repealed 1966). See generally 
PETER H. IRoNs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) (discussing the Justice Department's litigation 
control battles with three agencies created after Roosevelt's order: the National Recovery 
Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the National Labor Relations Board). 
44. Davis, supra note 38, at 5 (citing U.S. CoMM'N oN ORo. oF nm EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF nm 
Gov'T, REPoRT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 6 (1955)). 
45. See Olson, supra note 10, at 76; Davis, supra note 38, at 5. 
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Congress' continued use of decentralizing techniques is to be 
expected. Decentralization of litigating authority enlarges department and 
agency responsibility, thereby providing oversight committees greater 
opportunities to influence agency business.46 The Department of Justice 
has nonetheless strengthened its hand in recent years. The Carter 
Administration, through a 1979 executive order, established a Federal Legal 
Council to, among other responsibilities, facilitate "coordination and com-
munication among Federal legal offices" in order to "avoid inconsistent or 
unnecessary litigation by agencies."47 The Reagan Administration 
attempted to build upon these efforts, with mixed success, by expanding the 
Federal Legal Council's size48 and using Office of Legal Counsel opinions 
to strengthen Attorney General control of government litigation.49 
The Carter and Reagan Departments of Justice also advanced centrali-
zation objectives through self-serving interpretations of their statutory liti-
gating authority and the litigating authority of other governmental entities. 
The Carter Department of Justice, for example, rejected Department of 
State efforts to represent the United States in proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice.50 Referring to "the Attorney General's ple-
nary power over governmental litigation," the Department of Justice 
refused to accept arguments attempting to distinguish domestic from inter-
national courts. 51 The Reagan Department of Justice was even more 
aggressive in its attempts to centralize litigating authority. It openly chal-
lenged Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) efforts to file 
an amicus brief before a federal appellate court. 52 The case, Williams v. 
New Orleans, 53 called into question the use of race-conscious hiring goals 
in the settlement of a statutory employment discrimination lawsuit brought 
against the city of New Orleans. Although the EEOC is statutorily author-
ized to represent its interests before lower federal courts, the Department of 
Justice argued that the EEOC lacked authority to participate in Williams. 
46. See HoRownz, supra note 38, at 106-07. 
47. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1980), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988). 
48. See Olson, supra note 10, at 77. 
49. See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 47, 61-62 (1982) [hereinafter The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator] (concluding 
that, in the absence of contrary legislative directives, "the Attorney General . . • has broad plenary 
authority over all litigation in which the United States, or its federal agencies or departments, nre 
involved"); Removal of Members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 180, 187-88 (1982) (asserting that Congress did not, nnd could not, create a legislative scheme 
that allows the Council to sue other executive agencies nnd thereby skirt the President's supervisory 
control of the Executive Branch). 
50. Litigation Responsibility of the Attorney General in Cases in the International Court of 
Justice, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 233 (1980). 
51. Id. at 234. 
52. This episode is recounted at infra text accompanying notes 243-50. For a more detailed 
account, see Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency 
Independent?, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 273, 285-98 (1993). 
53. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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Specifically, since the EEOC is not authorized to be a party to suits against 
states and localities, the Department reasoned that the EEOC could not par-
ticipate as an amicus in such suits.54 
An even more dramatic example of Department of Justice efforts to 
strongarm independent agency self-representation occurred during the final 
days of the Bush Administration. In a dispute before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit between the U.S. Postal Service and 
the Postal Rate Commission, the Justice Department advised the Postal 
Service that it could not represent itself in court. 55 Referring to admittedly 
ambiguous statutory language, the Department argued that disputes between 
the Postal Service and the Rate Commission should not be decided in court 
but should instead be brokered within the Executive Branch.56 In an effort 
to avoid having a court interpret the statutory language, the Department and 
later President Bush "direct[ed]" the Postmaster General and the Postal 
Service's Board of Governors to withdraw from the case.57 The President 
went so far as to send a letter to each Postal Service Governor stating that, 
to ensure compliance with the directive, he would "if necessary exercise 
[his] authority to remove Governors of the Postal Service."58 Although a 
preliminary injunction blocked the threatened removal, and the D.C. Circuit 
ended this dispute by validating the Postal Service's claim of independent 
litigating authority, 59 the Bush White House demonstrated its willingness to 
take any necessary steps to further Department of Justice control of govern-
ment litigation. 
The Bush and Reagan Administrations also went further than the 
Carter Administration in their pursuit of centralization objectives. The 
Carter Administration both ceded Congress' grant of independent litigating 
authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission60 and signed mem-
oranda of understanding recognizing litigating authority in some depart-
ments and agencies within the Executive Branch. 61 In contrast, the Reagan 
Administration refused legislative initiatives designed to expand the litigat-
ing authority of government agencies and departments.62 Reagan pocket-
54. Devins, supra note 52, at 286-88. 
55. See Motion of the United States Postal Service For Leave to Appear as a Party on its Own 
Behalf at 3-4, Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(No. 91-1058). 
56. Id. at 8. 
57. Memorandum from President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec. 11, 
1992). 
58. Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie, Governor, U.S. Postal Service (Jan. 4, 
1993). 
59. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
60. See CoMMIITEE ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 
91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1977). 
61. See Olson, supra note 10, at 77-78. 
62. President Reagan, however, did approve the 1987 reauthorization of the Ethics in Government 
Act, which authorized independent counsel prosecutions of executive officials. See LoUIS FtsHER & 
NEAL DEVINs, PounCAL DYNAMICS OF CoNSTITUilONAL LAw 146-48, 156-59 (1992). 
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vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, for example, because it 
empowered a special counsel to obtain judicial review of Merit Systems 
Protection Board decisions. 63 Congress dropped this provision and success-
fully reintroduced the Act in 1989.64 The Bush Justice Department fol-
lowed suit, objecting to a proposed Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight with independent litigating authority that was to be established 
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 65 
The Reagan and Bush Administrations also challenged nonstatutory 
arrangements that executive departments and agencies had worked out with 
previous administrations. For example, the Reagan Administration vigor-
ously challenged Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) independence. 
Among other things, it took issue with a 1973 EPA General Counsel opin-
ion66 supporting EPA enforcement authority against federal facilities. 
Heads of the Department of Justice's Land and Natural Resources Division 
and its Office of Legislative Affairs challenged such EPA enforcement both 
on policy grounds (improperly limiting Executive Branch policy coordina-
tion) and constitutional grounds (improperly asking the courts to resolve a 
nonjusticiable intragovernmental dispute).67 This controversy emerged 
again during the Bush Administration in a dispute between the EPA and the 
Department of Energy. The Bush Department of Justice followed its prede-
cessor's lead and argued that it was inappropriate for the EPA to launch 
enforcement actions against the Executive Branch without the approval of 
the Attorney General. 68 
Aggressive pursuit of centralization by the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations is understandable. These two administrations seriously 
examined and pursued a hierarchical vision of government. Their belief 
that the Attorney General was czar over all government litigation was 
reflected in Department of Justice efforts to limit executive and independent 
agency autonomy before Congress and the courts. That the Carter 
63. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, 24 WI!I!KLY 
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1377 (Oct 26, 1988). For the president: ''The litigation of intra-Executive branch 
disputes conflicts with the constitutional grant of the Executive power to the President, which includes 
the authority to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates." !d. at 1378. 
64. See 135 CoNo. REc. S2779-81 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Levin). 
65. See Memorandum from American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, to Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (May 4, 1992) (discussing the legal bases for the 
Department of Justice's objections to establishing an Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight). 
66. EPA May Take Action Against Federal Facilities, Op. Gen. Counsel (Sept. 14, 1973), 
reprinted in Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
648-67 (1987) [hereinafter Compliance Hearing]. 
67. See Compliance Hearing, supra note 66, at 182, 206-13 (statement of F. Henry Habicht n, 
Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division); id. at 678-84 Oetter from Robert A. 
McConnell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs). 
68. Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Enforcement Between the Justice Department and 
the Environmental Protection Agency, [1992] Env't Rep. (BNA) 879-80 (June 13, 1977) (representing 
the adoption of the 1977 memorandum by the Busll Administration). 
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Administration also pursued centralization reveals the widely shared prefer-
ence, within the Executive Branch at least, for coordinated decisionmaking. 
2. Limits on Department of Justice Centralization 
White House efforts to preserve centralized litigating authority within 
the Department of Justice have ensured Attorney General control of virtu-
ally all government litigation.69 However, the Attorney General's ability to 
truly reign in governmental litigation is an idea whose time is yet to come; 
statutory limits on Department of Justice litigating authority may not be 
typical but are hardly uncommon. Congress, for example, has created 
offices of legal counsel within the House and Senate to ensure adequate 
representation of legislative interests in court. Specialized courts, such as 
the Tax Court and Court of Military Appeals, are the domain of "special-
ized agencies," such as the Internal Revenue Service70 and the Judge 
Advocate General.71 Executive departments and agencies as well as gov-
ernment corporations have been granted independent litigating authority to 
put numerous statutory programs into place through lower federal court liti-
gation. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury 
head up the list of such executive entities.72 Before lower federal courts, 
most independent agencies are able to conduct the bulk of their own litiga-
tion using agency attorneys.73 
The patchwork nature of governmental representation is often an out-
growth of political conflict. The experience of the Federal Trade 
69. The Department of Justice broadly interprets 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1988), which provides that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all [governmental] 
litigation,'' and 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988), which similarly states that "[e}xcept as otherwise authorized by 
law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney •.. but 
shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice." See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, 
supra note 49. According to that Office of Legal Counsel opinion, it is irrelevant that the Attorney 
General may allow agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation to represent themselves separately without explicit statutory authority. "Presumably, the 
Attorney General may reassert his supervisory authority at any time." ld. at 48 n.l. This is precisely 
what occurred in FTC v. Guigon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968), where the Department of Justice, 
through an amicus brief, successfully challenged the FTC's authority to enforce its subpoenas in federal 
district court without the Attorney General's consent. For further discussion of the relationship between 
the Department of Justice and the FTC, see infra text accompanying notes 74-86. 
70. 26 u.s.c. § 7441 (1988). 
71. 10 u.s.c. § 870 (1988). 
72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e)(2)(a), (f)(3)(a)(ii), 2606(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1366 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(f), 7605(a) (1988) (Environmental Protection Agency); 7 U.S.C. 
§ 228a (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988) (Department of Agriculture); 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (1988) 
(Department of Defense); 42 U.S.C. § 405(1) (1988) (Department of Health and Human Services); 29 
U.S.C. §§ 216(e), 663 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 30 U.S.C. § 822 (1988), 33 U.S.C. §§ 92la, 941 (1988) 
(Department of Labor); 26 U.S.C. § 7452 (1988) (Department of Treasury). 
73. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MULTI-MEMBER 
INDEPENDENr REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION (rev. ed. May 
1992) [hereinafter MULTI-MEMBER INoEPENDENr REGULATORY AGENCIES}; Memorandum from 
American Law Division, Congressional Research Service (July 7, 1988). 
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Commission (FTC) provides an example. Prior to 1973, the Department of 
Justice represented the FTC in injunctive and mandamus proceedings, civil 
penalty suits, and through the Solicitor General, all Supreme Court litiga-
tion.74 Commission attorneys handled judicial review and enforcement pro-
ceedings.75 This division of responsibility proved problematic for the FTC. 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice sometimes disagreed 
with FTC antitrust policymaking. Consequently, on matters referred by the 
FTC to the Department of Justice, significant delays in filing, unfavorable 
settlements, and the refusal to file cases became common practice?6 
On occasion, the Department of Justice also took issue with FTC posi-
tions in court. In the 1968 FTC v. Guigon decision, Justice argued that the 
FTC lacked statutory authority to judicially enforce its own subpoenas and 
possibly even lacked the power to appear in court.77 Justice's desire to 
maximize its litigating authority at the expense of the FTC is certainly 
understandable. Eyebrows were raised, however, when, after Justice's posi-
tion prevailed before a federal appellate court, Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold (1967-1973) refused to file a certiorari petition on the ground that 
"[ w ]hatever may be the merits of the Commission's position, [he did] not 
believe the issue [was] of sufficient general importance to warrant request-
ing the Supreme Court to review it."78 By not seeking certiorari, the 
Solicitor General shielded a Department of Justice victory from FTC attack. 
A second case that caused great distress at the FTC was St. Regis 
Paper Co. v. United States, a 1961 Supreme Court decision.79 In that case, 
the Antitrust Division agreed with the FTC's position that the agency's 
interest in investigating possible antitrust violations outweighed confidenti-
ality claims made by a company seeking to withhold reports filed with the 
Census Bureau. The Solicitor General, however, sided with the Census 
Bureau and the Bureau of the Budget in opposing the FTC. In a remarkable 
and much criticized brief, Solicitor General Archibald Cox (1961-1965), 
rather than "burdening the Court with briefs from different agencies," 
instead "attempt[ed] ... to set forth the competing arguments as effectively 
74. Davis, supra note 38, at 11-12. 
75. Id. at 11. 
76. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
343, 348-49, 355-57 (1978) [hereinafter Exchange Act Hearings] (testimony and statement of A. 
Everette Macintyre, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission); A. Everette Macintyre, The Status of 
Regulatory Independence, 29 FED. BJ. 1, 8-9 (1968) (noting instances during the 1960s when the 
Solicitor General refused FrC requests to file petitions for certiorari or refused to support an agency's 
position after allowing it to file in its own name). 
77. 390 F.2d 323, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1968). For an FrC commissioner's view of this litigation, see 
Macintyre, supra note 76, at 15-18 (arguing that the "legislative history of .•• the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, long-established practice, ..• and applicable legal precedent did not intend the result 
achieved by the court" (footnote omitted)). 
78. Davis, supra note 38, at 35 (quoting a letter from Solicitor General Erwin Griswold to Paul R. 
Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 26, 1968)). 
79. 368 u.s. 208 (1961). 
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and objectively as possible."80 Since Cox disagreed with the FTC, the bulk 
of his brief, "while fully recognizing the delicate balance of opposing con-
siderations,"81 explained why the FTC position was in error. 
Congress finally settled conflicts between the FTC and Justice to the 
benefit of the FTC. In 1973, Congress enacted legislation ensuring FTC 
independent litigating authority in enforcement actions before lower federal 
courts. 82 Congress expanded that authority in 1975 to include the power of 
the FTC to represent itself before the Supreme Court when the Solicitor 
General would not represent the agency.83 Tensions between the FTC and 
Justice, exacerbated by both the Antitrust Division's apparently successful 
attack on FTC litigating authority in Guigon and the Solicitor General's 
questionable advocacy in Guigon, St. Regis, and other cases, may help 
explain this political response. 84 That tension, however, explains only a 
small part of the story. In 1974, the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce had concluded that Justice's concern that "the govern-
ment maintain[ ] consistent positions on matters of common interest to all 
government agencies"85 outweighed the FTC's claim that "its litigation is 
conducted in the manner best calculated to achieve the agency's enforce-
ment goals."86 The decision to transfer litigating authority to the FTC, 
therefore, cannot simply be tied to Congress' displeasure with Justice's rep-
resentation of FTC interests. 
Instead, the ascendancy of independent FTC litigating authority is a 
by-product of political circumstances unique to a particular moment in 
time. 87 First, White House opposition to independent litigating authority in 
general or to the FTC, specifically, was neutered in both 1973 and 1975. In 
1973, President Nixon was willing to trade off the statutory specifications 
of FTC litigating authority because he strongly supported other bill provi-
80. Brief for the United States at 10, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961) 
(No. 47). 
81. /d. at 27. 
82. Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576,591-92 
(1973). 
83. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 204, 88 Stat. 2183,2199 
(1975). 
84. The 1973 Act was predicated on congressional findings that "the investigative and law 
enforcement responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission have been restricted and hampered 
because of inadequate legal authority." Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act § 408(a)(l), 87 
Stat. at 591. 
85. Letter from Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs to Congressman Harley 0. 
Staggers, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7702,7732. 
86. Letter from FfC to Congressman Harley 0 . Staggers, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7732. Indeed, the 1975 legislation 
reduced the scope of FrC litigating authority while expanding remaining litigating authority to include 
Supreme Court representation. FfC Improvement Act § 204(a)(3){A), 88 Stat. at 2199-200. 
87. These conclusions are principally drawn from interviews with current and former FfC 
officials. See Interview with Calvin Collier, supra note 4; interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
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sions establishing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.88 In 1975, the spectre of 
Watergate limited President Ford's ability to demand centralization of gov-
ernment litigation before the Supreme Court. Second, Congress' willing-
ness to decentralize government litigating authority was part of a larger 
Watergate-era attempt to limit the "imperial presidency." At roughly the 
same time, Congress limited White House authority in fiscal policy through 
the 1974 Budget Act, considered making the Department of Justice an 
independent agency, and debated legislation to further insulate independent 
agencies from executive influence. 89 Third, Congress was set to act on 
FTC-related litigation in both 1973 and 1975 regardless of the question of 
independent litigating authority.90 The costs to the FTC of raising the issue 
and to Congress of adding it to much larger statutory reform efforts were, 
therefore, low. Fourth, after Justice successfully attacked FTC litigating 
authority in Guigon, the FTC's independence was plainly at risk. These 
high stakes spurred the 1973 legislative action. Finally, public support of a 
powerful, independent FTC was strong in the mid-seventies' "age of 
consumerism." 
This confluence of circumstances was clearly unique to the FTC, as 
demonstrated by the contrasting experience of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). In 1973, Congress removed from proposed amend-
ments to the Securities and Exchange Act language that would have granted 
the SEC independ~nt litigating authority before the Supreme Court. This 
refusal to grant the SEC the same type of litigating authority that the FTC 
received two years later was also a by-product of political circumstances. 
Unlike the FTC, whose very independence was threatened by Department 
of Justice dominion over all litigation, the SEC already possessed independ-
ent litigating authority in all courts except the Supreme Court.91 Before the 
Supreme Court, moreover, the SEC was generally satisfied with the 
Solicitor General's handling of its cases. Although the SEC technically 
supported the proposed amendments, it did a poor job of making its case 
before Congress. In fact, when Congress held hearings on the proposed 
amendments, former SEC Chairman William Cary testified that he favored 
Solicitor General control of the certiorari decision.92 Philip Loomis, Jr., 
88. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs to Congressman Harley 0. 
Staggers, supra note 85, at 7732-33 (stating that President Nixon reluctantly accepted limitations on 
Department of Justice litigating authority "because of the Nation's pressing need for legislation 
authorizing construction of the pipeline"). 
89. On the 1974 Act, see LoUIS FisHER, THE PoLmcs oF SHARED PoWER: CoNGRESs AND run 
EXECUTIVE 177-204 (3d ed. 1993). On efforts to remove the Department of Justice from the Executive 
Branch, see Politics Hearings, supra note 13. On proposed legislation to authorize independent agency 
litigation before the Supreme Court, see STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 62-67. 
90. The focus of 1973 legislation was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See supra note 84. Legislation 
in 1975 involved a broad range of issues governing the structure and operations of the FI'C. 
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), (e) (1988). 
92. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 232 (statement of former SEC Chairman 
William Cary). 
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serving as SEC Commissioner at the time, expressed uncertainty about the 
amendments' value because the Solicitor General "has generally been sym-
pathetic" to the SEC and because the Solicitor "has clearly been of value in 
obtaining consideration of [SEC] cases by the Supreme Court and· in 
presenting cases to that Court."93 
The SEC presented a less convincing case for other reasons as well. 
Not only was the SEC's claim a weak one, but also Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold launched a strong claim against the amendments. Griswold, who 
served both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, invoked his personal 
prestige and that of his office in arguing that the proposed amendments 
challenged the integrity of the Solicitor General's office.94 In 1975, 
Solicitor General Robert Bork (1973-1977), limited by his role in the dis-
missal of former Solicitor General Archibald Cox in the "Saturday Night 
Massacre," could not launch a comparable counterattack against FrC 
efforts. 
Differences between the FrC and SEC experiences reveal that specific 
political pressures and circumstances, not a unified vision of independent 
litigating authority, define the existence, scope, and sweep of legislative 
exceptions to Department of Justice control of government litigation. These 
exceptions checker the landscape before lower federal courts. In addition to 
Congress and independent agencies (where limitations on Justice's author-
ity are to be expected), many executive departments, executive agencies, 
and government corporations possess some independence in pursuing their 
interests through litigation.95 While presidential control of the hiring and 
firing of executive officers provides some degree of centralizing control, 
legislative decentralization of litigating authority nonetheless impedes the 
coordination of Executive Branch arguments in court. 
Before the Supreme Court, however, centralization predominates. 
Statutory exceptions to Department of Justice control rarely include 
Supreme Court litigation. Congress, for the most part, prefers the Solicitor 
General to be the government's lawyer before the Court.96 At the same 
time, while the Solicitor General's control is much more than a shibboleth, 
his dominion over government litigation before the Supreme Court is 
illusory. 
93. /d. at 299 (statement of SEC Commissioner Philip Loomis, Jr.). This is still the SEC's view. 
See Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4; Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4. 
94. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278-80 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). Griswold concluded his opening presentation at the hearings with the statement, "I would be 
very sorry and would regard it as unfortunate if the function and prestige of the Office of the Solicitor 
General was impaired [by the amendment's passage]." /d. at 277. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37. For a fairly complete list of governmental entities 
that possess independent litigating authority, see Memorandum from American Law Division, 
Congressional Research Service, supra note 73. 
96. For Congress' reasons for preferring Solicitor General control, see infra text accompanying 
note 363. 
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B. Solicitor General Control of Supreme Court Litigation 
The Solicitor General is the Department of Justice's official voice 
before the Supreme Court97 and is the only litigant who has a right to par-
ticipate in Supreme Court litigation without seeking the Court's permis-
sion.98 This authority is indeed awesome. Nonetheless, the prospect of 
government entities outside the Department of Justice separately represent-
ing their interests before the Supreme Court is quite real. Statutory grants 
of litigating authority outside Department of Justice control, political neces-
sity, and comity between the Solicitor General's office and other govern-
ment entities ensure that the government does not speak as a single voice 
before the Supreme Court. 
Congress uses grants of independent litigating authority to legislative 
entities such as the Comptroller General and the Senate's Office of Legal 
Counsel to ensure the vigorous defense of its priorities.99 Since these types 
of grants allow Congress to protect its interests as a coequal branch of gov-
ernment from a Solicitor General answerable to the Attorney General and 
the White House, they are the least surprising statutory exceptions to 
Department of Justice control. For similar reasons, the Supreme Court has 
approved court-appointed counsel to prosecute contempt of court actions in 
cases where the Department of Justice is unwilling to defend the independ-
ent interests of the judicial branch.100 
Potential conflicts of interest with the Executive Branch explain statu-
tory grants of independent litigating authority to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) and to special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in 
Government Act.101 Another type of statutory exception is harder to 
explain. It applies to some but not all independent agencies as well as to 
97. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1992) (providing that the Solicitor General has authority for 
"[c]onducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases [within Department of Justice 
control], including appeals, petitions for and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments." 
(emphasis added)). 
98. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (Supp. IV 1992). 
99. 2 U.S.C. § 687 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-4(b), 6384(a), (c) (1988) (Comptroller General); 2 
U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288c, 288d, 288f (1988) (Office of Senate Legal Counsel). Although the President 
possesses limited appointment and removal power over the Comptroller General, the Comptroller is 
typically thought to be an arm of Congress. See Bowsher v. Synnr, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down 
the Gramm-Rudman Act on separation of powers grounds becatise the Act gives an executive function 
to the Comptroller General, who is subject to control by Congress); Bernard Schwartz, An 
Administrative Law "Might Have Been"-Chief Justice B11rger's Bowsher v. Synnr Draft, 42 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 221, 232 (1990) ("[T]he key to Bowsher 'is that the Comptroller General is removable by 
Congress, and therefore may not be entrusted with executive powers."' (quoting a letter from Chief 
Justice Warren Burger to Justice John Paul Stevens (June 10, 1986))). 
100. Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). The Solicitor 
General supports this position, recognizing that judicial authority here is "an ancillary aspect of its 
powers under Article III." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.2, United States v. 
Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (No. 87-65). 
101. The independent litigating authority of these officials is established in 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(0(4), 
437d(a)(6), (b) (1988) (Federal Election Commission) and 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1988) (special 
prosecutors) (referred to as "independent counsel"). 
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the Department of Agriculture, 102 and it is clearly a by-product of political 
circumstances. Two independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) and the FI'C, may represent themselves before the 
Supreme Court whenever the Solicitor General refuses to defend their posi-
tion. 103 This authority may also extend to the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A). 104 Finally, 
through the Hobbs Act, specified agencies may seek certiorari regardless of 
Solicitor General approval, but only to defend an administrative order. 105 
Hobbs Act cases are rare, for the agency can break free from the Solicitor 
General only when there is an irreconcilable divergence of views. In those 
cases, the agency and the Solicitor General each appear before the Court as 
named parties. 
The Hobbs Act and similar statutory exceptions to Department of 
Justice control limit the Solicitor General in other ways. For example, 
while these statutory exceptions do not prevent the Solicitor General from 
expressing views contrary to the agency's, it is sometimes in the Solicitor 
General's broader political interests to support the agency before the 
Supreme Court in a case in which he would otherwise decline participation. 
102. The Department of Agriculture, as a matter of course, refers all Supreme Court cases to the 
Solicitor General. The special problem of intraexecutive disputes outside of the Solicitor General's 
control has yet to arise. 
103. ICC power dates back to 1910, Pub. L. No. 475, ch. 231, § 212, 36 Stat 1087, 1150-51 
(1911), and has been reaffirmed several times. See generally Davis, supra note 38, at 6-11. For a 
discussion of FI'C litigating authority, see supra text accompanying notes 82-86. 
104. There is a lack of consensus about the litigating authority of the NLRB and the TV A before 
the Supreme Court The NLRB enjoys independent litigating authority under its statute, but the statute 
does not speak to the issue of Supreme Court representation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 155, 160(j), (1), 
161(2) (1988). The Solicitor General perceives that this silence implicitly authorizes his control. See, 
e.g., FRIED, supra note 7, at 175-82 (discussing Fried's handling of Communications Workers of Am. v. 
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988)); William E. Brigman, The Office of the Solicitor General of the United 
States 124 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) 
(discussing Archibald Cox's management of NLRB cases). Like the NLRB, the TVA lacks specific 
authority to represent itself before the Court The historic practice here, however, is for the TV A to 
assert complete independence. See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 47 
n.l. In fact, when the TVA and Solicitor General jointly present a case to the Court, the TVA General 
Counsel insists that his name appear above the names of Solicitor General attorneys (except for the 
Solicitor General himself). See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, cover, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (indicating the name of the General Counsel for the TVA above the 
names of the other Solicitor General attorneys but under the name of the Solicitor General). 
105. The Hobbs Act applies to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal 
Maritime Commission (FMC), the Secretary of Agriculture, and the U.S. Postal Service. Pub. L. No. 
901, ch. 1189, § 8, 64 Stat 1129, 1131 (1950) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988) (FCC, FMC, 
Secretary of Agriculture); Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (Postal Service). Under the Hobbs Act, the Attorney General is a statutory defendant in 
charge of the government's interests. The FCC, FMC, and Department of Agriculture, however, are 
authorized to intervene as of right and, regardless of the Solicitor General's action, to file for certiorari. 
The Act is silent on the issue of whether the affected agencies may ftle briefs and argue cases before the 
Court. 
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According to FfC officials, 106 this is what occurred in FI'C v. Ticor Title 
Insurance Co., 107 a 1992 case in which the FfC almost certainly would 
have sought Supreme Court review with or without Solicitor General partic-
ipation. As will be detailed below, 108 the Solicitor General, perhaps fearing 
the loss of controlling the government's arguments in the Ticor case, took 
charge of the case from the certiorari petition stage. 
Political calculations occur regardless of the presence of statutory 
exceptions, and they occur in different forms. Witness the Solicitor 
General's bizarre handling of the Bob Jones University 109 litigation in an 
attempt to stave off political embarrassment.110 Bob Jones concerned the 
IRS' longstanding practice of denying tax breaks to racially discriminatory 
private schools. After defending the government's policy in the early 
months of the Reagan Administration, the Treasury Department, persuaded 
by Attorney General William French Smith, reversed the IRS position. 111 
This reversal proved to be a public policy debacle. The President felt com-
pelled to tell the nation that he was not a racist, and the Department of 
Justice concluded that it was better to litigate than to moot the Bob Jones 
case. The rub, however, was that the Reagan Administration did not 
rescind its policy reversal. To escape this predicament, the Solicitor 
General asked the Court to appoint "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones 
University to defend the Treasury Department's earlier position. 112 The 
Court complied with this unorthodox request and heard arguments from 
William Ball on behalf of Bob Jones University, court-appointed "counsel 
adversary" William Coleman on behalf of the Treasury Department, and 
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds on behalf of the 
United States.U3 That Coleman defended and Reynolds opposed the IRS' 
nondiscrimination policy did not bother the Court or the Department of 
Justice. 
106. Department of Justice officials did not corroborate FTC officials' account of Ticor and were 
skeptical of their description. 
107. 112 S. Ct 2169 (1992). 
108. See infra text accompanying notes 310-11. 
109. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
110. For a general background discussion and analysis of the Bob Jones litigation, see CAPLAN, 
supra note 7, at 51-64; Neal Devins, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Political Analysis, I J.L. 
& PoL. 403 (1984); Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation of Private Education 
by the Internal Revenue Service, in PuBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE ScHooLS 133, 146-51 (Neal E. Devins ed., 
1989). 
111. Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1982, 
at 1. Accordingly, the Department of Justice filed a motion before the Supreme Court to moot Bob 
Jones and related litigation. Memorandum for the United States, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. 
United States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3). 
112. See Thomas McCoy and Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax 
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 441, 464 (1984). 
113. See Oral Argument Transcript, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States and Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3). 
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Dual governmental presentations such as in Bob Jones are, to put it 
mildly, an anomaly. Yet, occasionally the Solicitor General either explains 
to the Court an intragovernmental conflict or authorizes an executive or 
independent agency to present before the Court a position at odds with the 
Solicitor General's.114 Numerous factors explain the Solicitor General's 
willingness to limit his control in such a fashion. First, when the Solicitor 
General presents both sides of an issue to the Court but then chooses one, 
he in effect advocates that position. Second, sometimes amicus positions 
filed by other governmental entities serve the Solicitor General's interests 
better than his own filings. For example, in Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, it would have been impolitic for the Solicitor 
General to refuse to defend Massachusetts' veterans' preference due to the 
prevalence of analogous federal preferences. 115 To address the gross dis-
parities of the Massachusetts' preference on women, Solicitor General 
Wade McCree (1977-1981) authorized a coalition of executive and 
independent entities to file a joint amicus brief addressing "important con-
siderations concerning the differences between the federal and the state stat-
ute and the relevant proof requirements."116 
Third, Solicitor General authorization of dual representation some-
times improves its status as an impartial litigant before both the Court and 
Congress. In contrast, the Solicitor General shatters his imagined status as 
an objective nonpartisan advocate before the Supreme Court when he mutes 
the concerns of an agency with which he disagrees. This is especially true 
in cases where the independent agency is a party to the litigation and argua-
bly the Solicitor General's client. Consequently, the Solicitor General 
authorized dual representation in Dirks v. SEC, 117 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 118 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 119 and United Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB. 120 This concern is less acute in 
cases where the United States appears as a party or in an amicus capacity. 
Nonetheless, in a variety of such cases involving the SEC, the EEOC, the 
114. See infra Part II.A. 
115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979) (No. 78-233) (acknowledging that "[t]he Court's constitutional analysis of the 
Massachusetts program may affect the federal program ... in spite of the differences between the two"). 
116. See Brief of the Office of Personnel Management, the United States Department of Defense, 
the United States Department of Labor, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici 
Curiae at 3, Feeney (No. 78-233). Coincidentally, female Carter appointees were named counsel for 
each of these federal entities. 
117. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 
193-97. 
118. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 
224-32. 
119. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note 
219. 
120. 362 U.S. 329 (1960) (per curiam). In this case, a joint memorandum was prepared explaining 
why the NLRB supported the granting of certiorari and why the Solicitor General opposed certiorari. 
The Court sided with the NLRB and granted certiorari. 
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FERC, and the Federal Power Commission, the Solicitor General either 
authorized separate filings or took note of a disagreement between his 
office and an independent agency. 121 
As shown above, the dual representations brought about by statutory 
exceptions and political accommodations extend well beyond Congress and 
its agents to independent agencies and parts of the Executive Branch. 
While the Solicitor General is the dominant voice of government before the 
Supreme Court, dual presentations in numerous Supreme Court cases sug-
gest that Solicitor General control of that voice need not be, and in fact is 
far from, complete. It is simply wrong, therefore, to think of government 
litigation before the Supreme Court as being controlled by a monolithic 
Solicitor General. 
C. Summary: Independent Agencies and the Patchwork Nature of 
Independent Litigating Authority 
The reach of Department of Justice control in general and Solicitor 
General control in particular is ill-suited to generalization. Concomitantly, 
the nature and sweep of independent agency control over Supreme Court 
litigation are extraordinarily varied. For some agencies, independent litigat-
ing authority simply does not exist. This is the case with the National 
Transportation Safety Board;122 it used to be so with the FTC and the now 
defunct Civil Aeronautics Board. 123 In other instances, agency authority 
extends to Supreme Court litigation, although it sometimes depends on the 
Solicitor General's refusal to participate. The FEC, FTC, ICC, and perhaps 
the NLRB, Postal Service, and TV A have such power. 124 
In most cases, however, agency litigating authority is a mixture of 
dependence and independence. Even the level of dependence varies. For 
the SEC, EEOC, and FERC, independent litigating authority extends to the 
121. See infra notes 185-209 and accompanying text (SEC); infra notes 233-68 and accompanying 
text (EEOC). For example, the Federal Power Commission was allowed to file an amicus brief 
opposing the Solicitor General's brief in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 463 U.S. 1230 (1983), Solieltor General Rex Lee, instead of forcing 
the FERC to accede to his point of view, resolved the dispute by asking the Court to remand the case for 
further consideration of the FERC's position. See REBECCA M. SALOKAR, ThB SoLICITOR GBNERAL: THB 
PoLITics oF LAw 85 (1992). Another dispute involving the FERC was Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. Ln 
Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984), in which the FERC and the Department of Interior 
battled over an FERC license for a water project that affected numerous Indian reservations. The 
Solicitor General sided with the Secretary of Interior. For further discussion, see Herz, supra note 16, ot 
980 n.331. 
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988). 
123. See supra text aecompanying notes 74-89 for a discussion of the development of FfC 
litigating authority. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), like the FfC, claimed thot the Department of 
Justice inadequately represented its interests in court. See Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme 
Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALB LJ. 1442, 1451 n.48 (1969). Unlike with the FfC, 
Congress demurred on repeated CAB efforts to gain control over its litigation. See id. 
124. See supra notes 101-05 and accomponying text. 
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federal courts of appeals. 125 The Consumer Product Safety Commission's 
independent litigating authority extends only to district court actions. 126 
The independent litigating authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the Commodities Future Trading Commission is limited to appellate 
litigation. 127 Finally, there are several agencies whose arrangements are so 
complex that they defy description. The FCC is one of these. 128 In actions 
launched in district court, including suits to enforce Commission orders, the 
Department of Justice has plenary responsibility over the matter. The 
Commission handles appeals of radio and television licensing decisions 
before courts of appeals, but the Solicitor General handles them before the 
Supreme Court. Appeals of other FCC decisions are handled by the 
Commission before courts of appeals and in some instances up to the_ filing 
of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court. 129 
That patchwork nature of independent agency litigating authority is 
rooted in historical and organizational bases. Independent agencies were 
formed at different times and by different interest groups. Organizationally, 
the authorizing committees within Congress that oversee independent agen-
cies are driven by substantive issues, not structural arrangements. The 
Energy and Commerce Committee cares about FCC decisionmaking, not 
whether the FCC has more or less independent litigating authority than 
another agency. When structural issues bear on substance, as was the case 
when the Department of Justice ran roughshod over the FTC, oversight 
committees may well lead the charge for limiting executive control in favor 
of independent litigating authority. When structural issues do not bear on 
substance, as was the case with the SEC, Congress will not alter structure. 
Far-ranging structural reform proposals do occasionally crop up. 
Senator Abraham Ribicoff led a post-Watergate effort to assess regulatory 
organization, 130 but nothing came of this effort to alter the patchwork struc-
125. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), (e) (1988) (SEC); 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-4(b), -5(£)(1), -5(£)(2), -5(i), -6 (1988) (EEOC); 15 U.S.C. § 717(s) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 518 
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 717l(i) (1988) (FERC). 
126. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2061(e), 2071(a), 2076(b)(7) (1988) (granting limited authority to the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission to represent itself before federal district courts). 
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1988) 
(Commodities Future Trading Commission). The Commodities Future Trading Commission can also 
represent itself in some district court actions. See 7 U.S.C. § 4a-1 (1988). 
128. The Federal Mine Safety Commission is another. As described in an Administrative 
Conference Report: 
The Commission has an understanding with the Department of Justice that should the 
Commission wish to file a brief or otherwise defend its decisions, the Commission would 
coordinate its efforts with the Department of Justice. The Commission, however, does file 
routine procedural motions, through the Office of General Counsel, in the Courts of Appeal. 
Under the Mine Act, the Department of Labor has specific litigating authority in the areas of 
injunctive relief and enforcement of Commission orders and decisions •••• The Commission 
has supoena [sic] enforcement authority in the United States District Courts. 
MULTI-MEMBER INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 73, at 10-11. 
129. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519, 2350 (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 154(f)(i) (1988). 
130. See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60. 
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ture of independent litigating authority. It is unlikely that future efforts will 
prove more consequential. Each agency serves a quite different constitu-
ency, and it is highly unlikely that these divergent interests will jointly pur-
sue some effort to create uniform structural arrangements. The present 
haphazard structure is a far better reflection of divergent legislative 
interests. 
The likely perseverance of the current discordant system does not 
make it preferable to others. The next Part will examine the appropriate 
reach of Solicitor General authority in managing independent agency litiga-
tion before the Supreme Court. 
II 
SoLICITOR GENERAL CoNTRoL OVER INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
LmoATION 
Independent agency authority to litigate before the Supreme Court 
without Solicitor General authorization is the exception, not the rule. This 
model of centralized decisionmaking, with the Solicitor General at the helm 
of government litigation before the Supreme Court, is almost uniformly 
supported both by independent agency officials and attorneys in the 
Solicitor General's office.131 Exceptions to Solicitor General authority are 
tolerated not because these exceptions are necessary but because there are 
so few of them. This view is so pervasive that agencies with independent 
litigating authority nonetheless profess that extending such authority else-
where Inight comproinise the government's credibility before the Supreme 
Court.t32 
Supporters of centralization advance three principal contentions about 
Solicitor General representation.133 First, the Solicitor General is unlikely 
to abandon his independent agency client in favor of the Executive 
Branch's political agenda since he is sensitive to his client's concerns and 
generally unaffected by White House priorities. Second, it is beneficial for 
an independent agency to give up control of litigation in exchange for the 
well-deserved prestige of Solicitor General representation in the petition for 
certiorari and in Supreme Court advocacy. Third, Solicitor General central-
ization is of great value to the Supreme Court. Centralization saves the 
Court from facing an incomprehensible morass of conflicting governmental 
presentations, and it enables the Court to manage its docket by relying on 
Solicitor General recommendations on a case's cert-worthiness. 
131. Among those interviewed for this study, only former Assistant to the Solicitor General Carter 
Phillips advocated independent agency self-representation before the Supreme Court. Interview with 
Carter Phillips, supra note 5. 
132. Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
133. These contentions are advanced by centralization supporters who recognize independent 
agency authority to reach policy decisions at odds with the White House. Proponents of the unitary 
executive, in contrast, perceive that centralization is a necessary attribute of White House control of 
governmental departments and agencies. See infra text accompanying note 137. 
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While each of these arguments is powerful, none warrants complete 
Solicitor General control over independent agency litigation. There are too 
many counterexamples of Solicitor General insensitivity and hostility to 
independent agency priorities to allow the Solicitor General to define the 
legal policymaking of an entity outside of Executive Branch control. 
Instead, assuming that independent agencies may reach policy deci-
sions at odds with the Executive Branch, Congress should adopt a hybrid 
model where an independent agency, while otherwise bound to Solicitor 
General representation, has a presumptive right to pursue a case before the 
Court when the Solicitor General either perceives the case unworthy of cer-
tiorari or disagrees on the merits. This system, especially if Congress 
makes the Solicitor General a statutory litigant in all government cases 
before the Court, better serves the independent agency's interests without 
undermining the Solicitor General's critical roles in assisting the Court, 
advocating Executive Branch positions, or providing legal counsel to 
independent agencies. The balance of this Part will evaluate these argu-
ments for centralization and, along the way, make a case for the hybrid 
model of Solicitor General-independent agency representation.134 
A. The Solicitor General and His "Client" 
The Solicitor General manages Supreme Court litigation that 
originates in governmental agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, 
departments, and services. This centralization naturally limits the ability of 
the affected governmental interest to define its own litigation strategy. The 
question remains, however, whether the Solicitor General views as his cli-
ent the governmental entity he purportedly represents or the President, the 
head of the Executive Branch. The "traditional" view holds that, barring a 
direct conflict with stated White House policy, the Solicitor General's prin-
cipal client is the governmental entity involved in the litigation. 135 
Centralization of authority, under this view, serves a range of nonideologi-
cal objectives, including having all governmental parties that might be 
affected by a Supreme Court decision express their concerns to an objective 
broker; "avoiding the litigation of significant legal issues that have govern-
ment wide impact in a case which, because of its factual and procedural 
134. This discussion assumes that independent agencies, for better or worse, are empowered to 
reach policy decisions at odds with the White House. 
135. Proponents of this view include former Attorney General Griffm Beii, former Solicitors 
General Erwin Griswold and Robert Stern, and academic commentators Lincoln Caplan and Burt 
Neuborne. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 272-92 (testimony and statement of Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold); Solicitor General's Office: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 38-41 (1987) 
[hereinafter Solicitor General Hearing] (statement of Professor Burt Neuborne); CAPLAN, supra note 7, 
at 33-50; Griffm B. Beii, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief 
Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1057-59 (1978); Stern, supra note 3. 
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coloration, may be a poor vehicle for litigating the question";136 and trans-
ferring control on issues that apply to the government as a whole and are 
only of secondary concern to the governmental entity. In contrast, the "uni-
tary executive" view, while generally supportive of these bureaucratic justi-
fications, emphasizes that "the Attorney General alone is obligated to 
represent the broader interests of the Executive" and that centralization 
therefore facilitates "presidential supervision . . . over Executive Branch 
policies that are implicated in litigation."137 
Independent agencies care a great deal about which of these views 
predominates. The unitary executive view places the Solicitor General 
squarely under the Attorney General's control in the Executive Branch and 
subordinates independent agency perspectives to those of the White House 
and Attorney General. The traditional model, in contrast, places a high 
value on Solicitor General representation of independent agency views 
before the Court. 
1. Locating the Solicitor General 
It is somewhat surprising that there is any dispute over whom the 
Solicitor General represents. The Solicitor General is appointed by the 
President, housed in the Department of Justice, and subject to supervision 
from the Attorney General and to removal by the President. Yet, while no 
one doubts that the Solicitor General can be compelled to advance a posi-
tion he disfavors, it is nonetheless true, as the Carter Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) observed in 1977, that "[t]raditionally, ... the Attorney 
General has given the Solicitor General the primary responsibility for 
presenting the Government's views to the Supreme Court, and in the dis-
charge of that function the Solicitor General has enjoyed a marked degree 
of independence."138 
This tradition of independence has led many to conclude that the 
Solicitor General properly occupies a quasi-independent status within the 
Department of Justice. For example, in the wake of White House and 
Cabinet-level intervention in the crafting of the Solicitor General's brief in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 139 the Carter OLC pro-
claimed, in accordance with Attorney General Griffin Bell's wishes, that: 
The dual nature of the Attorney General's role as a policy and 
legal adviser to the President strengthens, in our view, the necessity 
for an independent Solicitor General. To the extent the Solicitor 
General can be shielded from political and policy pressures-with-
out being unaware of their existence-his ability to serve the 
136. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279 (statement of Solicitor Geneml Erwin 
Griswold). 
137. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 54. 
138. Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228, 229 (1977). 
139. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
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Attorney General, and the President, as "an officer learned in the 
law" is accordingly enhanced.140 
283 
Several Solicitors General have also proclaimed their independence, argu-
ing that they have "no master to serve except [their] country,"141 refusing 
to sign Supreme Court briefs that reflect White House policies with which 
they disagree, 142 and emphasizing that they have special responsibilities 
that limit their responsibility to the Executive Branch.143 Even Charles 
Fried (1985-1989), whose alleged fidelity to the Reagan Administration's 
social agenda subjected him to blistering accusations of improperly 
politicizing his office, spoke of the Solicitor General as the Court's "hand-
maiden[ ]" 144 and claimed that he ''had been appointed to exercise [his] 
judgment, rather than to try to guess what Ronald Reagan would have said 
about some particular technical matter."145 
Executive Branch officials do not typically display such acts of inde-
pendence or express such proclamations. This independence, however, is 
more ephemeral than real. The Solicitor General's traditional independence 
stems largely from the benefit the White House receives by allowing the 
Solicitor General to maximize his litigating capital and authority. Were the 
Solicitor General to appear overly partisan in his selection and presentation 
of cases, his credibility and his effectiveness as a litigant before the Court 
would be impaired. 146 Executive Branch interests, therefore, are well 
served by being represented before the Court by an advocate who has a 
special relationship with the Court. The centralization of litigating author-
ity in an individual who operates at the pleasure of the President also serves 
140. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 232-33. Griffin Bell's support of Solicitor 
General independence is reflected in his firsthand account of the politics of Bakke. See GRIFFIN B. BELL 
& RoNALD J. Osmow, TAKING CARE oF nm LAw 29-32 (1982). 
141. BIDDLE, supra note 11, at 98. 
142. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 58-59 (discussing Acting Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace's 
initial refusal to sign a government brief supporting tax breaks for racist schools in Bob Jones 
University); FRIED, supra note 7, at 202 n.* (discussing Solicitor General Philip Perlman's refusal to 
sign a government brief supporting the loyalty oath in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)); SALOKAR, 
supra note 121, at 74 (recounting Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's refusal to advocate delays of 
school desegregation in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)). 
143. See Erwin N. Griswold, Book Review, CoNSTmiTION, Spring-Summer 1991, at 73, 73 
(reviewing FRIED, supra note 7, and taking issue with Fried's view and arguing that a Solicitor 
General's responsibility is to the Constitution before the President); see also Eric Schnapper, Becket at 
the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1187 (1988) 
(identifying among the Solicitor General's primary responsibilities his duties as an officer of the Court); 
Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L.A. L. 
REv. 1167, 1169 (1988) (arguing that the Solicitor General must temper his advocacy of an 
administration's views so that he ''never sacrifice[s] his credibility and reliability as a trusted officer of 
the Court''). 
144. McGinnis, supra note 9, at 802 (quoting Charles Fried). 
145. FRIED, supra note 7, at 191. For a penetrating attack of Fried's position, see McGinnis, supra 
note 9, at 802 (describing the "handmaiden" view as "deeply flawed" and asserting that the Solicitor 
General "must project vigorously, albeit respectfully, the President's distinctive constitutional voice"). 
146. See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. 
L.A. L. REv. 1105, 1107-08 (1988). 
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Executive Branch interests. Consequently, it matters to the Executive 
Branch that Congress support centralization of Supreme Court litigating 
authority. Were the Solicitor General consistently to disregard independent 
agency interpretations in favor of Executive Branch preferences, Congress 
might well retaliate by limiting Solicitor General authority over government 
litigation, as it did with the FfC. 
Solicitor General independence also serves the Executive Branch in 
other ways. The prestige of the White House and Attorney General is 
improved by preserving Solicitor General independence. Specifically, by 
freeing the Solicitor General from partisan politics, the White House places 
the national interest in an objective advocate before the Supreme Court 
ahead of narrow political interests. Richard Nixon appointed Erwin 
Griswold for this reason, 147 and Griffin Bell defended the insulation of the 
Solicitor General's office from the White House for similar reasons. 148 
Solicitor General independence is also a by-product of an administra-
tive state too large not to be decentralized. The White House typically 
leaves political appointees to their own devices unless it cares deeply about 
an issue.149 Consequently, White House and Attorney General involvement 
in Solicitor General litigation is usually a function of a case's political sig-
nificance and its bearing on administration policy initiatives and/or constit-
uency interests. 
Supreme Court litigation is highly visible and, rather than involving 
one or two subject areas, cuts across all of government. Consequently, 
White House participation in Solicitor General advocacy arises with some 
frequency. Modem accounts of such intervention include the following: 
Harry Truman's involvement in an amicus curiae filing in Shelly v. 
Kraemer; 150 Dwight Eisenhower's drafting of portions of the government's 
brief in Brown v. Board of Education,· 151 the Kennedy Administration's 
order to Archibald Cox to challenge private discrimination as unconstitu-
tional state action;152 the Nixon Administration's intervention in the 
Solicitor General's filing in the Pentagon Papers153 case and its involve-
147. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 33. 
148. See BELL & OSTRow, supra note 140, at 31 (describing Bell's efforts to protect Solicitor 
General Wade McCree from the pressure of White House views about McCree's brief in Bakke). 
149. As Charles Fried put it: "Public office is an interpretive activity. The officer tries to mnke the 
best sense out of his assignment He must judge how to mnke a coherent morally and politically good 
whole out of his political superior's directives, pronouncements, hints, and actions." FRIED, supra note 
7, at 191. On the question of whether Fried actually embraced this interpretive loyalty model, sec 
McGinnis, supra note 9, at 814 (concluding that Fried "lacked .•. a coherent theory'' of the role of the 
Solicitor General's office in fulfilling "the administration's jurisprudential views"). 
150. 334 U.S. I (1948); see Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, 
and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817, 817-19 (1987) 
(interviewing Philip Elman). 
151. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 31; Silber, supra note 150, at 842. 
152. See VIcroR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JuSTICE 287-90 (1971). 
153. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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ment in school desegregation and antitrust matters;154 Gerald Ford's broker-
age of a dispute between the FEC and the Solicitor General in Buckley v. 
Valeo 155 and Ford Administration participation in school desegregation 
cases and Department of Interior matters;156 the Carter White House's 
reversal of the Solicitor General's preliminary position in Bakke; 157 the 
Reagan Administration's reversal of the Solicitor General's stated position 
in Bob Jones University and its insistence that the Solicitor General file an 
amicus brief calling for the overturning of Roe v. Wade in Thornburg v. 
College of Obstetricians; 158 President Bush's order to the Solicitor General 
to reverse its position in the Supreme Court and support increased state aid 
to black public colleges to remedy discrimination; 159 and President 
Clinton's indirect rebuke of the Solicitor General's brief in Knox v. United 
States, a child pornography case. 160 
The frequency of such White House involvement varies from adminis-
tration to administration. Carter Attorney General Griffin Bell disapproved 
of White House or Attorney General intervention in Department of Justice 
litigation. Bell sought to insulate the Solicitor General's office and to make 
sure that there was no "interfere[nce] with the policy prerogatives of our 
agency clients."161 Carter Solicitor General Wade McCree used his office's 
independence to protect agency prerogatives, allowing agency officials to 
present conflicting positions to the Court whenever he and they dis-
agreed. 162 In contrast, the Reagan Administration, especially the 
Department of Justice, believed more in hierarchical centralized contro1.163 
Centralization better enabled the administration to advance its vision of 
154. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing Nixon Administration intervention in the 
Pentagon Papers case); SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 73-74 (discussing Nixon Administration 
intervention in school desegregation). 
155. 425 u.s. 946 (1976). 
156. Ford Administration involvement in Buckley v. Valeo is recounted in Representation of 
Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of 
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-35 (1976) [hereinafter 
Representation Hearings]. Ford Administration intervention in Department of Interior matters is 
described in SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 75. 
157. See BELL & OSTRow, supra note 140, at 29-32; CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 39-48; FISHER & 
DEVINs, supra note 62, at 286. 
158. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 54-59, 139-44; FRIED, supra note 7, at 27-35. 
159. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 1991, at B6; Carol Innerst, Bush Orders Switch on Black College Aid, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
1991, at A4. 
160. See David Johnson, Clinton Calls for Expansion of Child Pornography Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1993, at A14. For a more detailed examination of Clinton White House intervention in 
Solicitor General filings, see Joan Biskupic, For Solicitor General's Office, New Directions in Old 
Cases, WASH. PoST, Feb. 22, 1994, at AI. 
161. Bell, supra note 135, at 1061. 
162. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WAsH. U. L.Q. 337, 346 
(1981) (contending that the Solicitor General should either present, or allow the agency to present, the 
agency's views where ''well-grounded differences of opinion" exist). 
163. See generally GEORGE C. EAos & MicHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFoRM?: REAGAN's 
REGULATORY DD..EMMA (1984). 
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good government cohesively-a vision which coincidentally involved the 
government speaking in a unitary voice personified by the President. In 
addition to aggressively advancing its social agenda through the courts, the 
administration also openly urged the judiciary to practice judicial 
restraint.164 Not surprisingly, dual presentations from agencies and the 
Solicitor General declined during this period as efforts by the Attorney 
General to oversee Solicitor General advocacy increased. 165 
Direct White House and Attorney General participation in Supreme 
Court advocacy should not be overstated. Aside from the natural tendency 
to let subordinate officials act independently, White House involvement is 
also lessened by the powerful disincentives of undermining the Solicitor 
General's effectiveness before the Court and spurring on Congress to pass 
statutes exempting independent and perhaps executive agencies from 
Solicitor General control. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Attorney 
General supervises the Solicitor General and that the President supervises 
the Attorney General. These clients hire the Solicitor General to be their 
representative, and they have the power to fire the Solicitor General. When 
either the White House or the Attorney General directs the Solicitor General 
to reverse his position, he complies. "When that happens," as Charles Fried 
explained at his confirmation hearing, "it would be peevish and inappropri-
ate, for the Solicitor General to be anything but cheerful in accepting that 
reversal."166 Representing administration policy, in Rex Lee's words, is 
simply "a part of [the] job."167 The Solicitor General's obligation, like that 
of other Executive Branch attorneys, "is most reasonably seen as running to 
the Executive Branch as a whole and to the President as its head."168 "He is 
unique ... because of his duty to an individual-the President-who has a 
constitutional responsibility to interpret the law independently from the 
Supreme Court."169 
The Solicitor General's status as part of the Executive Branch, how-
ever, is not at all inconsistent with the apparent independence that most 
Solicitors General exercise. First, Presidents appoint Solicitors General 
164. See William F. Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A. J. 59,59 (1982) (announcing the 
Reagan Justice Department's "undertaking [of] a conscious effort to encourage judicinl restraint"); 
Steven Markman, Judicial Selection: The Reagan Years (stating that Reagan "was detennined to appoint 
to the federal courts only those individunls who are committed to the rule of law''), reprinted in FisHER 
& DEVINs, supra note 62, at 204. 
165. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 81-134 (describing the Solicitor Genernl's working relationship 
with Attorney General Edwin Meese and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds); 
FRIED, supra note 7, at 40-54 (same). For defenses of Reagan Administration intervention as typicnl, 
see Clegg, supra note 9, at 967; Albert Lauber, Jr., An Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's Office 
Become Politicized?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1987, at 22, 23. For a suggestion that dual representations 
were rare under Fried because Fried himself perceived his role as the ultimate interpreter of the law 
within the government, see McGinnis, supra note 9, at 803·04. 
166. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 70. 
167. Lee, supra note 15, at 599. 
168. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 16, at 1298. 
169. McGinnis, supra note 9, at 802. 
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whose personal views are compatible with the White House agenda. 
Solicitors General, for the most part, advocate positions that the President 
endorses or at least does not opposeP0 Second, direct White House and 
Attorney General control is rare because executive officers typically are 
allowed to put their programs in place and because of the risks of harming 
Solicitor General relations with Congress and the Court. Third, since the 
Solicitor General enhances his institutional strength by appearing independ-
ent of executive control, he, too, has an incentive not to appear to be the 
Executive Branch's lackey. 
Nevertheless, the appearance of independence is not independence. 
This is not simply a matter of semantics. When Solicitor General "indepen-
dence" is at odds with the White House or Attorney General, his client can 
reign him in. When Solicitor General "independence" is at odds with 
Congress or some independent agency, he cannot be ordered to reverse 
course. Consequently, a lack of litigating authority places congressional 
and independent agency autonomy at risk. Congress, of course, inherently 
possesses and has statutorily granted itself such authority. Most independ-
ent agencies, however, are without this power. The next portion of this 
study will examine the Solicitor General's representation of independent 
agencies that lack independent litigating authority. 
2. The Solicitor General and Independent Agencies 
Independent agency litigation poses special problems for the Solicitor 
General. Unlike most governmental entities, independent agencies typi-
cally handle their own cases in lower federal courts. The Solicitor General, 
therefore, reviews independent agency cases without the benefit of input 
from Department of Justice lawyers who typically represent the government 
in the lower courts.171 More significantly, although Congress limits these 
agencies' independence by entrusting their Supreme Court representation to 
the Solicitor General, independent agencies nonetheless are empowered to 
make policy decisions at odds with White House positions. The President 
apparently lacks the power to remove commissioners of whose conclusions 
170. Not surprisingly, when there is a change in administration, a new Solicitor General is typically 
appointed. Moreover, with a new administration, the substance, objectives, and management of 
Solicitor General advocacy change. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Mendoza, 464 
U.S. 154, 161 (1984), that "the panoply of important pubHc issues raised in governmental litigation may 
quite properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing positions with 
respect to the resolution of a particular issue." For an extended discussion of Mendoza, see Joshua I. 
Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General's Independence, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1119, 1123-
51 (1988). 
171. Department of Justice lawyers typically play a significant role in assisting the Solicitor 
General to determine the cert-worthiness of governmental litigation. See HoRoWITZ, supra note 38, at 
54-56. Donald Horowitz found that Department of Justice lawyers' recommendations not to seek 
certiorari in cases where the government lost in federal courts of appeals were followed 99% of the time. 
Id. at 57. 
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he disapproves, 172 but he is free to tell the commissioners' lawyer, the 
Solicitor General, whether the agencies' cases shall be pursued before the 
Supreme Court and how they shall be presented before the Court. This 
situation is delicate, and without question, the Solicitor General's record is 
mixed. At times, an agency's position receives great deference; at other 
times, the agency is accorded no deference. Sometimes, the Solicitor 
General allows the agency to present its argument independently when a 
conflict arises; sometimes, he shuts out the agency from the case. 
The Solicitor General's office, for the most part, views independent 
agency litigation as substantively different from purely executive represen-
tation. One difference concerns the frequency of seeking certiorari. The 
Solicitor General seeks certiorari far more often in cases involving 
independent agencies than in those involving executive agencies. In a 1966 
study, William Brigman emphasized the Solicitor General's willingness to 
pursue independent agency certiorari requests.173 In 1973, Erwin Griswold 
testified against legislation that would expand independent agency litigating 
authority, in part because his office took great pains to advance agency 
claims before the Supreme Court. Noting that the Solicitor General had 
acceded to more than seventy-five percent of independent agency certiorari 
requests (98 out of 128) from 1963-1973, Griswold argued that independent 
agencies were especially well represented by his office. 174 Although these 
figures do not account for a great number of cases where the Solicitor 
General convinces an independent agency not to request certiorari, 175 and 
although more recent figures suggest that there has been a significant drop 
in the Solicitor General's independent agency certiorari requests, 176 the 
172. Some scholars have argued that the President's constitutional duty to take care that the Jaws 
are faithfully executed extends to the statutory removal of commissioners for good cause when those 
commissioners frustrate presidential efforts to execute the Jaw as the President sees fit. See Interview 
with Terry Eastland, supra note 5. See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENEROY IN THE ExECUTJVB: THB 
CASB FOR THE STRONO PRESIDENCY (1992). 
173. See Brigman, supra note 104, at 120. 
174. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 281 (statement of Solicitor General Erv1in 
Griswold). Griswold presented the following figures: 
Agency No. of Requests No. of Deprivals 
NLRB 62 48 
FTC 28 18 
FPC 26 24 
CAB 3 1 
FCC 1 1 
SEC 8 6 
Total 128 98 
Percentage 
77% 
64% 
93% 
33% 
100% 
75% 
76.6% 
175. One witness at the 1973 Hearings suggested that Griswold's figures were overstated because 
''there would be very few instances in which the Solicitor General would be unable to persuade the 
Commission to go along with his Office's judgment" !d. at 366 (statement of Professor Roy Schotland). 
This conclusion is borne out by the FTC's current practice of following Solicitor General 
recommendations in all but the most unusual of cases. See infra Part II.B.2. 
176. See Todd Lochner, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the 
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 19 VA. L. RBv~ 549, 576-77 (1993). 
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Solicitor General gives independent agency requests a higher priority than 
Executive Branch requests. 
A second measure of the special status of independent agencies is the 
Solicitor General's willingness to allow differences between independent 
agencies and other parts of the government to be aired before the Supreme 
Court. Solicitor General Griswold proclaimed that he tried "very hard to be 
sure that [independent] agencies had an opportunity to have their views 
before the Court," sometimes by indicating in a Solicitor General filing that 
the independent agency holds a different view and sometimes by allowing 
an independent agency to file a separate brief in its own name. 177 Other 
Solicitors General have generally followed this approach. At one extreme, 
Robert Stem (1952-1954) proclaimed that "[t]he Court is always appraised 
of the intragovernmental conflict, and I know of no case in which the 
Solicitor General has precluded an independent agency from presenting its 
position.'0178 The Carter Department of Justice likewise was careful "not to 
interfere with the policy prerogatives of [its] agency clients" and was quite 
willing to allow dual governmental representation.179 At times, Archibald 
Cox expressed similar sentiments. In responding to Justice Felix 
Frankfurter's exasperation with the government's presentation of competing 
independent agency and Solicitor General perspectives in the St. Regis case, 
Cox meekly suggested that "if the dispute were only [with the Antitrust 
Division of] the Justice Department, [he was] sure [he] could settle it."180 
Rex Lee, although perhaps seeking to deflect criticism for politicizing his 
office, took pains in one controversial Consumer Product Safety 
Commission case to state that his decision not to seek certiorari did "not 
reflect any disagreement with the merit of the commission's decision.''181 
In other matters, Lee both took note of conflicting agency positions in his 
filings and authorized dual presentations. 182 
Independent agencies fare better in the Solicitor General's office than 
other governmental litigants. Their cases are pursued more often, and their 
differences with the Solicitor General are more likely to be presented before 
the Court. Especially when the independent agency is a named party, the 
Solicitor General's office typically views an independent agency as its prin-
177. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 290 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
178. Stem, supra note 3, at 157. 
179. Bell, supra note 135, at 1061. 
180. JAMES E. CLAYTON, THE MAKINo OF JusncE 155 (1964) (quoting St. Regis oral argument). 
181. Letter from Solicitor General Rex E. Lee to Nancy H. Steorts, Chair, Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1983, at A13. For further discussion of this 
issue, see Molly Sinclair, 7-Year Fight to Ban Foam Comes to an End, WASH. PoST, Aug. 26, 1983, at 
07. 
182. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (identifying two of Lee's disputes with the EEOC); 
infra text accompanying notes 194-97 (discussing Lee's approval of dual Solicitor General-SEC 
presentations in Dirks v. SEC). 
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cipal client.183 While the Solicitor General may seek to moderate the 
independent agency's position because of competing agency or executive 
interests,l84 he rarely tosses aside the independent agencies' views. Thls 
special status is sometimes considered a nuisance, but it exists. 
Sensitivity to agency interests, of course, is not the same as uniformly 
vigorous advocacy on behalf of independent agency litigants. The Solicitor 
General must cautiously select and present cases to balance the interests of 
independent agencies and their oversight committees, White House policy 
priorities, the interests of other parts of the Executive Branch-especially 
other divisions within the Department of Justice-and the need to protect 
litigating capital with the Supreme Court. In some instances, this balancing 
act is responsive to independent agency concerns. Sometimes, however, the 
Solicitor General subordinates agency concerns to pursue some other 
agenda. A comparison of Solicitor General management of SEC, FCC, and 
EEOC litigation reveals the variability of Solicitor General representation. 
a. The SEC 
Solicitor General relations with the SEC have been quite positive.185 
Congress declined to grant the SEC independent litigating authority in 1973 
in large measure because Erwin Griswold presented, and the SEC did not 
oppose, a convincing case for the adequacy of Solicitor General representa-
tion.186 In the early 1980s, the SEC passed on a congressional invitation to 
revisit the independent litigating authority issue.187 Up through the tenure 
of President Reagan's first Solicitor General, Rex Lee, the Solicitor General 
presented SEC positions to the Supreme Court. 188 When differences arose, 
the SEC position was either noted by the Solicitor General or independently 
183. Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5. 
184. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 274 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold); John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General's Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734, 738 (1983) 
(discussing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982)); Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra 
note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
185. This is the unanimous view of current and former SEC officials as well as officials within the 
Solicitor General's office. See, e.g., Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 282-84 (statement of 
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold) (explaining the few instances in which the Solicitor General declined 
to file petitions for certiorari on behalf of the SEC); Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Address to the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities 6 (Nov. 19, 1988) (transcript on file with author) (maintaining that the Solicitor General has 
been deferential to SEC views); see also Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4; Interview with Ken 
Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
187. Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4. 
188. Former SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, while not critical of Charles Fried's 
management of the Solicitor General's office, perceived that Fried was less interested in representing 
SEC concerns than was Rex Lee. Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 200-02 (discussing CIS v. Dynamics litigation). Bush Solicitor General Ken Starr 
seems to have followed Fried's lead. This is reflected in Starr's handling of Chicago Mercantile Exch. 
v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990). See infra text accompanying 
notes 204-08. 
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presented by the agency. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Daniel, the SEC filed an amicus brief supporting a worker's claim that 
involuntary noncontributory pension plans were entitled to federal securi-
ties protections.189 The Department of Labor and the Solicitor General, 
who disagreed with this interpretation, filed a separate amicus brief on this 
point.190 Another example of the Solicitor General's accomodation of SEC 
concerns was Marine Bank v. Weaver, 191 where the Solicitor General 
crafted a compromise to resolve an intragovemmental dispute between the 
Commission and bank regulatory agencies.192 
Dirks v. SEC193 presented a more striking example of Solicitor 
General willingness to accommodate SEC concerns. In Dirks, the SEC 
claimed that improperly fostering trading need not involve wrongfully 
obtained inside information. 194 In contrast, the Solicitor General argued 
that the disclosure of information legally available to others was not subject 
to sanction.195 At the certiorari stage, the Solicitor General allowed the 
SEC to argue its position separately. Rather than file a separate petition, the 
Solicitor General added a footnote to the SEC petition stating his view that 
the SEC position was in error. 196 After the Court granted certiorari, the 
SEC continued to represent its interests in the case, including the presenta-
tion of oral arguments. The Solicitor General filed an amicus brief oppos-
ing the SEC interpretation but acceded to the SEC's request that his brief 
include "some generalized statements of support for the agency's insider 
trading enforcement program."197 This deference is partially explained by 
the fact that the SEC was the named party in the case. Yet, the Solicitor 
General's willingness to moderate his own brief to assuage agency fears of 
dual representation was truly extraordinary. 
SEC-Solicitor General relations have changed slightly in recent years. 
From 1986 to 1993, the Solicitor General's office became more restrictive, 
paying less attention to agency priorities in advancing the Solicitor 
General's vision of the government's position.198 Although relations 
between the SEC and the Solicitor General remained good, dual filings and 
the acknowledgment of competing SEC perspectives in the Solicitor 
189. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, International Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (No. 77-754). 
190. See Motion of the United States for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, Daniel (No. 77-754). 
191. 455 u.s. 551 (1982). 
192. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 738. 
193. 463 u.s. 646 (1983). 
194. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) 
(No. 82-276). 
195. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks (No. 82-276). 
196. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission in Opposition at 17 n.*, Dirks (No. 82-
276). 
197. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 738. For an overview of Dirks, see Justice Department Breaks 
with SEC on Dirks' Equity Funding Censure, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A-3 (Oct 29, 1982). 
198. See Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4. 
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General's filings diminished. In the 1987 CTS v. Dynamics199 litigation, 
the Solicitor General agreed with the SEC that the Indiana Control Share 
Acquisition Act violated the Commerce Clause but disagreed with the 
SEC's assertion that the law also failed under federal preemption doc-
trine.200 On the Commerce Clause issue, the Solicitor General stated that 
"[t]he Commission and the United States believe ... that the Chapter vio-
lates the Commerce Clause."201 On the preemption issue, rather than note 
the SEC's competing view, the brief simply asserted that "[t]he United 
States believes that the Indiana Chapter is not preempted by the Williams 
Act."202 A careful reader of the brief might infer that mention to the 
"United States" and not "the Commission and the United States" signalled 
SEC disapproval of the preemption argument. Apparently, to secure 
Solicitor General representation, the SEC had to accept the "compromise" 
of having only arguments endorsed by the Solicitor General presented to the 
Court. 
The Solicitor General did not offer the SEC a compromise in Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 203 a 1990 lawsuit which involved the SEC's 
grant of permission to stock exchanges to trade so-called "index participa-
tions" as securities.204 The Commodities Future Trading Commission 
(CFTC) successfully disputed this SEC interpretation before the Seventh 
Circuit, arguing that "index participations" were commodities subject to 
CFTC, not SEC, regulation.205 The Solicitor General agreed with the 
CFTC and opposed the granting of certiorari, although the SEC was a 
named party to the litigation.Z06 The Solicitor General stated in his brief, 
''While the SEC's views about its statute and the industry it regulates are 
entitled to weight, we cannot agree with the SEC that the decision below is 
incorrect ... in dividing authority between the SEC and CFTC."207 The 
SEC was not allowed to file a separate brief. Instead, the Solicitor 
General's filing summarized and discredited the SEC's views.208 
199. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
200. See Goelzer, supra note 185, at 6-7. 
201. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States as Amici Curine at 3, 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-71). 
202. /d. 
203. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990). 
204. "Index participations are contracts of indefinite duration based on the value of n basket (index) 
of securities. The seller of an IP ... promises to pay the buyer the value of the index as measured on n 
'cash-out day.'" Id. at 539. 
205. See Brief for the Commodities Future Trading Commission as Amicus Curine, Chicago 
Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1528), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 
(1990). 
206. See Brief for the Federnl Respondent in Opposition, American Stock Exch., Inc. v. Chicago 
Mercantile Exch., 496 U.S. 936 (1990) (No. 89-1502). 
207. /d. at 8. 
208. See id. at 20 ("[P)etitioners and the SEC have cited the provision .•. known as the 'SEC 
savings clause.' That provision does not, in our view, justify limiting the CFTC's jurisdiction over IPs." 
(citations omitted)). 
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While occasionally disappointed by the Solicitor General, the SEC 
nonetheless endorses the current arrangement. Former General Counsel 
Dan Goelzer explained why: "[T]he Solicitor General is almost invariably 
deferential to the Commission's views. It is extremely rare that the 
Solicitor General has flatly opposed the Commission's urging a position it 
wanted to take."209 The experiences of recent years, however, reveal that 
the Solicitor General is willing to prevent the SEC from advancing a posi-
tion at odds with his own. 
b. The FCC 
FCC relationships with the Solicitor General are difficult to character-
ize because of an extraordinarily confusing statutory scheme. This scheme 
sometimes allows the FCC to appeal cases directly to the Supreme Court, 
sometimes makes the FCC entirely dependent on Department of Justice 
attorneys throughout the course of litigation, and sometimes authorizes 
FCC representation before federal courts of appeals and Solicitor General 
representation before the Supreme Court.210 As a result, the type of case 
defines Solicitor General-FCC relationships. 
FCC views are accorded the least weight when Department of Justice 
attorneys represent the FCC throughout the course of litigation. These 
cases originate in federal district court and include enforcement actions 
brought by the Commission as well as employment discrimination and 
Freedom of Information Act suits filed against the Commission. Although 
FCC and Department of Justice attorneys typically work together in prepar-
ing pleadings and other legal memoranda in these cases, policy-based dis-
putes occasionally arise. One such dispute involved the League of Women 
Voters' challenge to a statutory prohibition of public television and radio 
station editorials, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1982 FCC v. League 
of Women Voters211 decision. When the suit was first filed in 1979, the 
FCC and the Carter Justice Department concluded that the editorial ban was 
unconstitutional. The government filed motions in federal district court 
stating that it would not defend the ban's constitutionality.212 However, 
two critical events reinvigorated League of Women Voters and precluded its 
dismissal.213 First, Congress amended the editorial ban rule so that it would 
apply only to public television and radio stations that receive federally 
funded Corporation of Public Broadcasting grants?14 Second, the Reagan 
Administration assumed office, and the Department of Justice softened its 
209. Goelzer, supra note 185, at 6. 
210. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
211. 468 U.S. 364 (1984), overruled by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
212. See League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
213. The case was kept alive by the Senate Legal Counsel, who moved to intervene in the case and 
defend the Senate's interest in the constitutionality of the editorial ban. See id. at 381. 
214. Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, ch. 1, 95 Stat 725, 725-36. 
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position on the constitutionality of editorial bans.215 Disregarding the 
FCC's unchanged position, the Reagan Department of Justice unilaterally 
pursued the case from beginning to end. When the Supreme Court rejected 
the Department's defense of the ban and struck down the amended statute, 
the FCC rejoiced, calling the decision "a significant breakthrough."216 
In sharp contrast to such instances of Department of Justice control 
stand cases where the FCC holds a statutory right to seek certiorari before 
the Supreme Court in appeals of FCC declaratory orders. FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation211 and FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 218 typify such 
cases. In both instances, the FCC and Solicitor General each presented 
their divergent views as statutory litigants before the Supreme Court. In 
Pacifica, the FCC successfully argued that certain words could be kept off 
the airwaves for most broadcasting hours while the Solicitor General chal-
lenged the FCC order as overbroad because the Commission did not con-
sider "the context in which the offending words were used."219 MCI 
concerned an FCC order mandating that AT&T had no obligation to inter-
connect its facilities with those of MCI. The D.C. Circuit invalidated this 
order. The FCC petitioned for certiorari, and the Solicitor General filed a 
petition in opposition.220 The Court denied certiorari, but the case is note-
worthy because of a blistering footnote in the FCC brief "question[ing] 
exactly what interests of the United States the Solicitor legitimately repre-
sents in this case."221 
Licensing decisions, handled by the FCC before federal appellate 
courts and by the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court, involve a 
murkier division of responsibility. Sometimes, the Solicitor General 
resolves disputes with the FCC simply by refusing to petition the Supreme 
Court for certiorari;222 other times, the Solicitor General authorizes the FCC 
215. See Brief for the United States, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (No. 
89-912); see also Kathleen Sylvester, Editorial Freedom Case Set for Court's Calendar, NAT'L L.J., 
Mar. 14, 1983, at 5. 
216. Fred Barbash, High Court Rules for Public TV: Right to Comment Upheld Despite Federal 
Funding, WAsH. PoST, July 3, 1984, at Al (quoting FCC General Counsel Bruce Fein). 
217. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
218. 439 u.s. 980 (1978). 
219. Brief for the United States at 14, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528). 
But cf. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Pacifica (No. 77-528) (''The [FCC's] order seeks to protect 
parental and privacy interests ... to the extent that this Court's constitutional opinions pennit." 
(footnote omitted)). 
220. See Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. United States, 
439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-216); Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition," 
FCC v. MCI Telecommunieations Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270). 
221. Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition" at 1 n.l, MCI (No. 78-270). 
222. An example of Justice's willingness to exercise this authority involved FCC "must-ciiil)'" 
rules, which required cable companies to CIIIl)' local television signals. The Department perceived these 
rules as unconstitutional, and the Solicitor General, therefore, refused the FCC's request to petition the 
Supreme Court to review an appeals court decision striking down these rules. See Government Won't 
Appeal Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 28, 1988, at 37. 
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to present its divergent views without Solicitor General interference.223 
These decisions are especially dependent upon the specific circumstances 
surrounding them. 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 224 decided by the Supreme Court in 
1990, exemplifies such fact-specific litigation. Metro Broadcasting called 
into question the constitutionality of FCC preferences and set-asides to 
increase the number of minority broadcasters. The case was a political bat-
tlefield. In response to FCC efforts to reexamine its affirmative action pro-
grams during the Reagan Administration, Congress had enacted 
prohibitions on FCC preference policy reconsideration.225 The FCC, there-
fore, could not argue in its own name that its preference scheme was consti-
tutionally suspect. Bush Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's (1989-1993) 
commitment to Reagan Administration challenges to affirmative action fur-
ther complicated this highly visible litigation. The FCC and the Solicitor 
General jointly opposed the granting of certiorari226 in an attempt to throw 
this politically hot issue back to Congress and to the D.C. Circuit, where 
new judicial appointments might resolve an apparent intracircuit conflict.227 
This would also enable the Solicitor General to avoid having to decide 
whether to allow the FCC to assert its position independently before the 
Court.228 Finally, for supporters of preferences within the FCC and the 
Solicitor General's office, this strategy would prevent the Court from hear-
ing a case that most thought would place another nail in the affirmative 
action coffin.229 
Certiorari was granted, however. The Solicitor General was set to file 
a brief challenging the constitutionality of FCC preferences but still faced 
the question of whether to allow the FCC to file separately. By this time, 
the Commission strongly supported the preference program, thanks to 
President Bush's appointment of three pro-preference commissioners.230 
Perhaps because the Solicitor General's office was sensitive to the FCC's 
precarious position with Congress, perhaps because it feared that the FCC 
would claim independent litigating authority to argue the case, or perhaps 
223. This is precisely what occurred in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 
U.S. 775 (1978). Here, Carter Solicitor General Wade McCree resolved a dispute between the 
Department of Justice and the FCC by allowing the FCC to present its position to the Court. See Brief 
for Petitioner, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (No. 76-1471). 
The Department of Justice's views were presented in a separate brief. See Brief for the United States, 
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (No. 76-1471). For further discussion of this conflict, see 
FCC Cross-Media Ban Backed, FAcrs oN Fll.E WoRLD NEWs Dra., June 23, 1978, at 467. 
224. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
225. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. 
REv. 125, 138-41 (1990). 
226. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453). 
227. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Daniel Armstrong, supra note 4. 
228. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5. 
229. ld. 
230. See Devins, supra note 225, at 152-53. 
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because the political repercussions were not worth the costs, the Solicitor 
General permitted the FCC to defend its preferences independently before 
the Court.231 The agency did so successfully. One observation is clear: 
Solicitor General-FCC relations were defmed by the specific circumstances 
of the case at the certiorari stage and at the time the case came before the 
Court.232 
Metro Broadcasting, MCI, Pacifica, and League of Women Voters do 
not lend themselves to sweeping generalizations about Solicitor General 
involvement in FCC litigation. Rather, they suggest that variable presenta-
tion schemes and factual circumstances defme this relationship. 
c. The EEOC 
The Solicitor General-EEOC relationship presents an example of 
extreme infringement on agency independence. The Solicitor General 
today refuses to recognize the EEOC as an independent agency. While the 
EEOC may influence Solicitor General decisionmaking on a given issue,233 
the Solicitor General seems disinclined to allow the EEOC to advance com-
peting arguments before the Supreme Court. This practice is a relatively 
new one. During the Carter years, the Solicitor General allowed the EEOC 
to file briefs at odds with his positions. 234 During Reagan's first term, 
Solicitor General Rex Lee took note of disagreements between his office 
and the EEOC.235 In recent years, however, the Solicitor General has freely 
231. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 1, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453). The Solicitor General filed a brief arguing that the diversity 
preference was unconstitutional. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Metro Broadcasting (No. 89-453). It is less obvious why Solicitor General Starr authorized 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to file nn nmicus brief opposing the 
Department of Labor in Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991). See Motion for Leave to File Brief for 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (No. 89-1541). By authorizing this filing, OSHRC was able to 
challenge the Solicitor General's representations that the Department of Labor, not the OSHRC, was 
empowered to definitively interpret an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretruy of Labor 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. According to OSHRC Gcnernl Counsel Earl 
Ohman, there was no controversy over the Solicitor General's granting of OSHRC'S request to file an 
nmicus brief. Telephone Interview with Earl Ohman, General Counsel, OSHRC (Dec. 2, 1993). 
232. The fact-specific nature of Solicitor General-FCC relations is also revealed in the joint 
decision of the Solicitor General and FCC not to seck certiorari in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 
(1992), where the D.C. Circuit refused to extend Metro Broadcasting to gender preferences. For further 
discussion of this case, see Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Autumn 1993, nt 145. 
233. In Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), EEOC ndvocncy before the 
Solicitor General's office helped shnpe the government's nmicus filing. Interview with Charles Shanor, 
supra note 4. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16 (discussing separate filing by EEOC in Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney). 
235. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curine in Support of Petitioners at 24 n.23, 
Frrefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 464 U.S. 808 (1983) (No. 82-206) (''The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission disagrees with this interpretation of Section 706(g) and believes 
that its adoption might call into question numerous extant consent decrees and conciliation agreements 
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disregarded competing EEOC perspectives-even in cases where the EEOC 
is a party.236 
The demise of the EEOC's relationship with the Solicitor General 
began with Congress' 1964 decision to give the EEOC significantly less 
independence than other independent agencies. Republican leadership, 
believing that EEOC cease and desist power would prove ruinous to busi-
ness interests, limited the EEOC to a strictly advisory role.237 The 
Department of Justice controlled government-initiated employment dis-
crimination litigation. In 1972, Congress granted the EEOC independent 
litigating authority but not cease and desist authority.238 Moreover, 
Congress limited the agency's independent litigating authority in two sig-
nificant respects. First, the Department of Justice retained exclusive control 
of suits against state and local governments.239 Second, the Department of 
Justice, through the Solicitor General's office, controlled EEOC Supreme 
Court litigation. In 1974, the EEOC challenged Solicitor General control 
by filing an amicus brief in a Supreme Court affirmative action case, De 
Funis v. Odegaard, 240 without seeking Department of Justice approval. 
Despite the EEOC's contention that "[i]ts independent character ... gives 
it the same right as any other independent organization to ask the Court to 
consider its views,"241 the Court refused to consider the brief, siding instead 
with the Department of Justice's claim of plenary control of EEOC 
Supreme Court litigation.242 
The EEOC, therefore, lacked much of the power and prestige held by 
most independent agencies. Other than its independent litigating authority 
and the restrictions on presidential appointment and removal authority, the 
to which the EEOC is party."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at I n.*, Connecticut v. 
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (No. 80-2147) (noting that "[t]he EEOC has declined to join in this brief'). 
Justice Brennan, who rejected the Department of Justice's position in Teal, referred in his opinion to the 
EEOC's refusal to sign onto the Department of Justice brief. 457 U.S. at 451 n.ll. 
236. It is unclear whether Clinton Administration Solicitor General Drew Days will follow this 
approach. In a telephone interview conducted before he was nominated as Solicitor General, Days told 
me that he cautioned EEOC officials about a Carter Administration reorganization proposal, discussed 
infra text accompanying note 251, precisely because it might make them vulnerable to Executive 
Branch domination. Interview with Drew Days, supra note 5. 
237. See generally HuGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 141-52 (1990). 
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b), -5(f)(l), (f)(2), (i), -6 (1988). For the politics behind this enactment, 
see GRAHAM, supra note 237, at 420-49. 
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), (f)(2) (1988) (incorporating provisions of 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and 1972 amendments). 
240. 416 u.s. 312 (1974). 
241. Memorandum of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Response to the 
Department of Justice at 2, De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-295). 
242. Solicitor General Robert Bork had earlier urged the Court to refuse the EEOC's unauthorized 
submission. See Warren Weaver Jr., Law School's Plan to Aid Minorities Goes to High Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1974, at AI, Al3. The Supreme Court ultimately refused the EEOC brief, although 
individuals attending oral argument in De Funis claim that some of the Justices took the EEOC brief to 
oral argument Interview with Margaret Spencer, Former EEOC Attorney, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 
1992) (discussing her work on the De Funis case). 
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EEOC was without a significant independent voice. The Department of 
Justice's Civil Rights Division, moreover, had great authority to enforce 
separately and interpret employment discrimination laws. Adding to this 
complexity, the Department of Justice's Civil Division, which represents 
the government when it is sued in employment discrimination matters, also 
had the power to interpret separately employment discrimination laws. This 
combustible combination of concurrent authority exploded during the 
Reagan Administration. 
The triggering event occurred in Williams v. City of New Orleans, 243 
where the EEOC intended to file before a federal appellate court an amicus 
brief supporting race-conscious affirmative action. The EEOC draft brief 
flatly contradicted an amicus brief that the Department of Justice Civil 
Rights Division had already filed in the case.244 Indeed, the EEOC charac-
terized as "deplorable" the Justice Department's failure to consult the 
EEOC before filing its amicus brief.245 While the EEOC saw the expres-
sion of conflicting views as producing "considerable public benefit,"246 
Justice saw the EEOC brief as an outrageous challenge to the Civil Rights 
Division's exclusive authority to manage employment discrimination law-
suits involving state and local government. In th<?. Civil Rights Division's 
view, the government should speak with one voice in state and local 
cases-the voice of the Civil Rights Division. To prove its point, the Civil 
Rights Division claimed it would block the EEOC's attempts to file its ami-
cus brief. 247 
The EEOC ultimately capitulated and voted not to file an amicus brief 
in Williams. 248 Direct White House and Attorney General pressure and the 
fear of a losing court battle with the Civil Rights Division contributed to 
243. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984). 
244. The Justice Department brief argued that the afftnnative action plan infringed on the rights of 
"innocent nonblack employees." Justice Department Seeks to Overturn Promotion Plan for New 
Orleans Police, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-8, A-9 (Jan. 10, 1983). The EEOC draft brief castigated 
the Department of Justice for making this argument: 
Contrary to this uniform body of case law approving the use of prospective employment 
goals, however, the Department of Justice asks this Court to hold that judicial relief under 
Title VII must be limited to ••• actual victims of discrimination .... 
No court has accepted the Justice Department's construction of [the relevant title VII 
section} .... 
Draft EEOC Brief, Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (No. 82-3435), reprinted in 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-1 (Apr. 6, 1983). 
245. EEOC Chides Justice for "Deplorable" Action on New Orleans Police Case, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA), at A-2 (Feb. 1, 1983). 
246. Fred Barbash & Juan Williams, Administration Prods EEOC on Quotas Brief, WAsH. PoST, 
Apr. 7, 1983, at AI (quoting EEOC). 
247. See EEOC Bows to White House Pressure, Says It Won't File New Orleans Brief, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) at A-6, A-7 (Apr. 6, 1983). 
248. See id. at A-6. 
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this decision.249 Ironically, the appellate court in Williams made repeated 
reference to the EEOC's draft brief after receiving a leaked copy of the 
brief through another amicus brief. 250 The EEOC lost a much larger battle 
with the Solicitor General as a consequence of Williams. During the 
Williams controversy, the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion sup-
porting the Civil Rights Division. This opinion went beyond the state and 
local authority issue and asserted that a Carter Administration reorganiza-
tion, transferring authority from the Departments of Justice and Labor to the 
EEOC, de facto made the EEOC an executive agency "subject to the super-
vision and control of the President."251 For the Solicitor General's office, 
this memo settled the issue of EEOC independence. 252 
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOCZS3 
proved to be the culmination for the Solicitor General, if not for the 
EEOC's oversight committees in Congress, of the transplant of the EEOC 
into the Executive Branch. Although the EEOC, a party in the case, had 
successfully defended federal court authority to order affirmative action hir-
ing in an employment discrimination lawsuit,254 the Solicitor General uni-
laterally reversed the Commission's position in a brief it filed on the 
Commission's behalf before the Supreme Court.255 That the EEOC was a 
party in the case mattered little to the Solicitor General. Charles Fried, in 
his autobiography Order and Law, did not even mention the EEOC in his 
account of the case.256 Moreover, when the EEOC explained its position to 
Solicitor General attorneys, it was flatly told that it was a part of the 
Executive Branch and would have to swallow Department of Justice oppo-
sition to affirmative action.257 The only concession offered by the Solicitor 
General was opposing certiorari in the case so that the Court could resolve 
the Sheet Metal Workers issue in two analogous cases already before the 
249. Following the decision to withdraw, EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas commented that the 
Commission was strongly influenced by the argument that it had no legal authority in public sector 
employment discrimination lawsuits. See Barbash & Williams, supra note 246, at A9. 
250. See Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571 n.1, 1572 n.S (1984) (Wisdom, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
251. The OLC opinion is described in Report by House Committee on Government Operations on 
EEOC Handling of Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-1, D-4 
(May 25, 1984). 
252. Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5. 
253. 478 u.s. 421 (1986). 
254. EEOC v. Local 638 •.. Local28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'1 Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d 
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
255. See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656). Remarkably, then-Acting EEOC 
General Counsel Johnny J. Butler signed this brief. Butler, however, claimed in an interview that he and 
the EEOC vigorously opposed the Solicitor General's position. Interview with Johnny J. Butler, supra 
note 4. It is difficult to say whether Butler sought to win favor with Reagan Administration officials 
through his signature or whether he honestly felt obligated to sign on to the brief. Whatever the 
explanation, Butler and the EEOC did not alter their views on the permissibility of affirmative action. 
256. See FRIED, supra note 7, at 110-16. 
257. Interview with Johnny J. Butler, supra note 4. 
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Court.258 It is unclear whether the Solicitor General made this concession 
to accord some respect to EEOC positions or whether he feared the reper-
cussions of entirely disregarding EEOC views. Once the Court granted cer-
tiorari, however, EEOC prerogatives played no apparent role in the 
Solicitor General's handling of the case.259 
· Sheet Metal Workers is an extreme example of the Solicitor General's 
discounting of EEOC autonomy, but it is not an anomaly. In Riverside v. 
Rivera, 260 the Solicitor General rejected EEOC efforts to participate as an 
amicus supporting respondents' claims in an attorney's fees case.261 
Instead, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in opposition to respon-
dents' claims without mentioning the EEOC's conflicting position. 262 
Ironically, EEOC arguments were ultimately presented to the Court. The 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund reproduced in its amicus filing 
a leaked draft of the EEOC memorandum recommending its participation as 
amicus curiae in support of respondents.263 Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins264 offers another recent example of Solicitor General unwilling-
ness to note EEOC differences. In that case, the Solicitor General did not 
note EEOC disagreement with his view that an employer could rebut evi-
dence of sexual stereotyping by a preponderance of the evidence rather than 
by clear and convincing evidence.265 
Several factors explain the demise of EEOC independence relative to 
the Solicitor General. To start, the EEOC is vulnerable to attack because it 
lacks cease and desist authority and other significant attributes of indepen-
dence. Moreover, during the Reagan years, three divisions of the 
Department of Justice took direct aim at the EEOC. The Civil Rights 
Division openly challenged EEOC authority in the Williams case, arguing 
that conflicting EEOC interpretations undercut the Division's ability to 
advance effectively its interpretation of Title VII in state and local govern-
ment cases. The Civil Division, in order to defend effectively employment 
discrimination suits filed against the government, advanced arguments that 
258. See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9, Sheet Metal Workers (No. 
84-1656) ("respectfully request[ing the] Court to hold the present case pending disposition of 
Vanguards and Wygant"). 
259. At the time Sheet Metal Workers was argued before the Court, a high-ranking EEOC officinl 
suggested to me that Justice's disregard of EEOC prerogatives was not necessarily unwelcome. 
260. 477 u.s. 561 (1986). 
261. See Justice Department Rejects EEOC Advice, Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees in Rig/1ts Cases, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-1 (Jan. 9, 1986). 
262. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Riverside v. Rivero, 
477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224). 
263. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in Support 
of Respondents, Rivera (No. 85-224). 
264. 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
265. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23 n.IO, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). Respondent's attorneys noted this omission in their brief: ''The 
Solicitor General's failure to comment on EEOC's position ••. is curious." Brief for Respondent nt 42 
n.32, Price Waterhouse (No. 87-1167). 
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were at odds with pro-plaintiff EEOC interpretations.266 Finally, the Office 
of Legal Counsel joined this fray by declaring the EEOC an executive 
agency. These three divisions exerted far more influence on their 
Department of Justice brethren in the Solicitor General's office than did the 
EEOC.267 
The decline of EEOC authority relative to the Solicitor General is an 
extreme and atypical case. The Carter reorganization, by placing clearly 
executive functions within the EEOC, transformed the EEOC into a hybrid 
between an independent and an executive agency. More significantly, the 
Civil Division and Civil Rights Division both have power to interpret 
employment discrimination legislation in statutorily designated spheres of 
authority. The erosion of EEOC independence before the Solicitor General 
is nonetheless striking. Empowered to argue cases before federal district 
and appellate courts,268 the EEOC routinely finds its views withheld from 
the Supreme Court when they diverge from the views of the Solicitor 
General. 
* * * * 
The experiences of the SEC, FCC, and EEOC reveal the variable char-
acter of Solicitor General-independent agency relations. While no 
independent agency is immune to having its views ignored, some agencies 
receive far more respect than others. Factors that explain this variable treat-
ment include the following: the likelihood of agency positions conflicting 
with other government positions, especially those of the Department of 
Justice; the willingness of Congress to intercede statutorily on an agency's 
behalf; the sweep of independent litigatip.g authority, cease and desist 
authority, and other powers which empower an independent agency and 
insulate it from the Executive Branch; and the likelihood that independent 
agency action conflicts with White House agenda items.269 With reference 
to these factors, one would expect the EEOC to fare far worse than the FCC 
and SEC. 
That the Solicitor General, a political appointee, is influenced by polit-
ical circumstances comes as no surprise.27° Concerns over Solicitor 
266. In Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985), for example, the Civil Division advanced 
arguments identical to those of the Civil Rights Division and contrary to those of the EEOC in its efforts 
to defend the Air Force from the terms of an affirmative action consent decree. 
267. See HoROWITZ, supra note 38, at 54-60 (explaining that recommendations by Justice 
Department attorneys carry more weight than recommendations by agencies); Brigman, supra note 104, 
at 129 (discussing the power of Department of Justice divisions to shape Solicitor General positions). 
268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b), -5(f)(l), -5(f)(2), -5(i), -6 (1988). 
269. Another factor is the quality of agency representation. Rex Lee, for example, noted that the 
Solicitor General often "give[s] deference to those people that we know will perform their own 
screening functions." SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 84 (quoting Rex Lee). Under Lee, the Solicitor 
General's office often deferred to NLRB recommendations because "[w]e knew that they were the ones 
that had done a very careful job and had done good lawyering before they sent us the 
recommendations.'' ld. 
270. This sensitivity to political circumstances dates back to the rise of the administrative state. "A 
study of all requests by the [independent] commissions for review over a five year period from July, 
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General politicization led to mid-seventies legislative reform efforts involv-
ing the Justice Department itself and agencies such as the FfC and SEC.271 
Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice accused the Reagan Administration of 
placing its political agenda ahead of supposed Solicitor General indepen-
dence.272 A 1992 study of the Solicitor General likewise concluded that 
"[a]lthough solicitors general enjoy a functional autonomy from the admin-
istration, this independence does not translate into substantive freedom 
from the policies and politics of the White House."273 
This perception of the Solicitor General as a political agent is problem-
atic not just for independent agencies but for the Solicitor Gener~ himself. 
For some Solicitors General, balancing agency independence concerns 
against the traditional measures of a case's cert-worthiness creates a catch-
22. On one hand, Solicitors General may take a great deal of heat for not 
seeking certiorari. For example, consumer groups attacked as political foul 
play a 1983 Solicitor General decision not to seek certiorari to defend a 
Consumer Product Safety Commission ban on urea-formaldehyde foam 
insulation.274 On the other hand, Solicitors General such as Erwin 
Griswold have deferred to agency independence by seeking certiorari in a 
disproportionate number of independent agency cases.275 In some of these 
cases, an agency's independence determines whether the Solicitor General 
seeks certiorari. The Solicitor General, in these cases, is not always speak-
ing his mind on the case's cert-worthiness. 
Politics tells only part of the story. SEC, FCC, and EEOC experiences 
also reveal that Solicitor General attitudes toward independent agencies 
change significantly from administration to administration. As a result, 
independent agency autonomy likewise will ebb and flow. Wade McCree 
preferred to allow dual governmental representation rather than have his 
office trump independent agency desires. He claimed that it was "essential" 
for the Solicitor General ''to avoid any appearance of formulating 'policy' 
for the agencies."276 Rex Lee took a more lawyerly approach, noting 
independent agency disagreements in Solicitor General filings and allowing 
independent agencies to separately argue cases in which they were a 
1957, through June, 1962, shows that denial of access to the Supreme Court is no mere threat and that it 
is based, to a significant degree, on policy considerations." Brigman, supra note 104, at 120; see also 
id. at 130 (discussing a policy dispute between the Department of Justice and the Federal Maritime 
Commission in Federal Maritime Bd. v. Pacific Far East Line, lnc., 363 U.S. 827 (1960)). For further 
discussion of the partisan nature of Solicitor General advocacy, see Lochner, supra note 176, at 562-65. 
271. See, e.g., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 54-67; Politics Hearings, supra 
note 13, at 3; Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 272-92 (testimony and statement of Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold). 
272. CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 277 ("[O]ne of the great misdeeds of the Reagan Administration 
was to diminish the institution that .•. once stood for the nation's commitment to the rule of law."). 
273. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 175. 
274. See David Shribman, Foam Insulation is Cleared of Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1983, nt A-1. 
275. See supra note 174. 
276. McCree, supra note 162, nt 345. 
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party.277 Lee, although a strong believer of the Solicitor General's respon-
sibility to further presidential priorities, acknowledged that the Solicitor 
General, as a "litigating lawyer, ... is an advocate for a client whose objec-
tive is to achieve the most favorable result possible in that particular 
case."27s 
In contrast, Charles Fried, believing that the government should speak 
as one through the Solicitor General, strongly disfavored dual presentations 
or any acknowledgment of conflict. Fried saw himself as the kingpin of 
government litigation before the Supreme Court. He was "appointed to 
exercise [his] judgment," and he perceived public office to be "an interpre-
tive activity."279 Fried once informed NLRB General Counsel Rosemary 
Collyer that he would "'plead error on behalf of the government'" were the 
Board to file a case without his approval.280 Indeed, even in the rare case 
where he authorized an independent agency to present its views to the 
Court, Fried made the independent agency pay a price. For example, in 
allowing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to file a separate brief in 
Mistretta v. United States, 281 Fried "succeed[ed] in getting the Commis-
sion to tone down its brief a little" by insisting that the Commission "back 
off from using this as an occasion to establish" a theory of separation of 
powers that Fried disfavored.282 
White House desires, statutory grants of authority, political circum-
stances, and Solicitor General philosophies all contribute to the Solicitor 
General's uneven representation of independent agency interests. Although 
the Solicitor General is often a dedicated advocate for independent agency 
interests, he is ultimately an unreliable advocate. The Solicitor General 
should not be faulted, for Congress created a system which places responsi-
bility for independent agency litigation in the hands of an Executive Branch 
official duty-bound to White House and Attorney General priorities. Under 
this scheme, it is inevitable that conflicts will arise and that resolution of 
those conflicts will often occur to the detriment of independent agency per-
277. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 235. 
278. Lee, supra note 15, at 595. 
279. FRIED, supra note 7, at 191. 
280. Interview with Rosemary Collyer, supra note 4. 
281. 488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
282. FRIED, supra note 7, at 168. Lincoln Caplan, therefore, goes too far in suggesting that Fried 
embodied the Reagan Administration's politicization of the Solicitor General's office. See CAPLAN, 
supra note 7, at 195-209, 264-67. In fact, Fried has been criticized for putting his principles of 
interpretation ahead of those of the Reagan Administration. See McGinnis, supra note 9, at 803-04. 
Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that, when it came to complying with specific demands of the 
Attorney General, Fried perceived the Attorney General to be his supervisor. On the question of the 
constitutionality of independent agencies, for example, Fried remarked: 
I did not come to my office committed to this program of submitting the independent agencies 
to the President's power, but here more than anywhere else the Attorney General's attraction 
to theoretical discussion had its effect. ... I was convinced. I had to be, since in the end this 
battle would have to be waged by me in the Supreme Court." 
FRIED, supra note 7, at 158. 
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spectives. While the Solicitor General does not want to risk losing the 
power he holds under this scheme by persistently and outrightly defying 
agency wishes, it is equally true that he need not view the independent 
agencies whose Supreme Court litigation he controls as clients. 
B. The Solicitor General as Advocate 
The Solicitor General, contrary to bureaucratic folklore, is not "a relia-
ble, non-ideological and, essentially, non-political" advocate for the govern-
ment before the Supreme Court.283 The experiences of the SEC, FCC, and 
especially the EEOC attest to this conclusion. Nonetheless, most independ-
ent agency officials and attorneys in the Solicitor General's office perceive 
that the benefits of Solicitor General representation outweigh the costs of 
Solicitor General control.284 However, independent agency officials and 
Solicitor General attorneys typically do not consider the viability of an 
FfC-type hybrid arrangement where independent agencies may take control 
of cases that the Solicitor General refuses to pursue on their behalf. This 
hybrid structure preserves most of the advantages of Solicitor General rep-
resentation without unduly restricting agency autonomy. 
Solicitor General counsel provides significant benefits. Solicitor 
General lawyers are extraordinarily able and skilled at Supreme Court 
advocacy. The "skills, experience and knowledge that the office has gained 
over many years"285 manifest themselves in a number of ways, including 
superlative briefs and oral advocacy before the Court. Since the Solicitor 
General's office limits its advocacy to a group of nine individuals, it has a 
far better sense than most litigants about which buttons to push before the 
Supreme Court. 
Solicitor General advocacy also confronts the often difficult decision 
whether or not to seek certiorari. Some cases contain "bad facts," and an 
agency would, therefore, be "ill-advised to litigate in the Supreme Court an 
important legal issue in a factual context in which the Court's sympathies 
are likely to be with the other side."286 This "broader perspective and 
greater objectivity'>287 save the independent agency from a potentially dev-
astating Supreme Court decision. For independent agencies, this "perspec-
tive and objectivity" are a mixed blessing. The Solicitor General does not 
283. Solicitor General Hearing, supra note 135, at 40 (testimony of Professor Burt Neubome). 
284. Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4; 
Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; see also Exchange 
Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278-80 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin Griswold), 299 (statement 
of SEC Commissioner Philip Loomis, Jr.). 
285. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279-80 {statement of Solicitor Genernl Erwin 
Griswold). 
286. ld. at 279. Charles Fried, too, has spoken of the dangers of "bad facts," referring to Sheet 
Metal Workers as an "unattractive ... case in which to oppose preferences." FRIED, supra note 7, at 
110. Current and fonner Deputy Solicitors General have also spoken of this danger. See Interview with 
Ken Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5. 
287. Stem, supra note 3, at 158. 
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seek certiorari in many independent agency cases because he considers the 
legal issue, while quite significant to the agency, relatively unimportant. 
Although this screening function enhances the likelihood of success when 
the Solicitor General pursues a case, it offers little solace to an independent 
agency that is forced to take defeat on the chin. 
The prospects that a particular case will not be deemed cert-worthy are 
of significant but not overriding concern to independent agencies. The 
issue presumably can be relitigated and, perhaps with a better set of facts or 
some other development, the issue will ultimately be presented to the 
Supreme Court. Yet when certiorari is not sought for political reasons or 
when independent agency perspectives are tossed aside or severely limited 
in cases presented to the Court, Solicitor General authority compromises 
independent agency autonomy in a fundamental way. In such circum-
stances, independent agencies should be allowed to separately advance their 
arguments before the Court-assuming, that is, that independent agencies 
are constitutionally authorized to make policy decisions at odds with other 
parts of the Executive Branch and the President.288 
Some Solicitors and Attorneys General view proposals of this type as 
heretical challenges to the Solicitor General's authority as the government's 
spokesperson before the Supreme Court. Attorney General Tom Clark cau-
tioned Congress against independent agency appeals before the Supreme 
Court because "their objective [would] be so single-minded that they will 
ignore ... the broad objectives of the United States."289 Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold likewise objected to independent agency autonomy saying 
that "it would seriously affect the handling of the Government's legal work 
before the Supreme Court."290 
These reactions are understandable but overstated. Limitations on 
Solicitor General control do not necessarily undermine Solicitor General 
authority. By allowing the Solicitor General to opt out of independent 
agency litigation, the hybrid model serves Solicitor General interests with-
out significantly intruding upon the ability to represent governmental inter-
ests before the Court. First, in cases where the Solicitor General either 
agrees with the agency or can convince the agency of his position, Solicitor 
General authority is unaffected. In these instances, the independent agency 
benefits from Solicitor General counsel, and the Solicitor General protects 
its government litigation prerogatives. Second, in cases where the Solicitor 
General might feel constrained either to seek certiorari or to advance argu-
ments with which he does not fully concur, the hybrid arrangement frees 
him from involvement without the opprobrium of undermining agency 
independence. Third, cases where the Solicitor General is castigated for 
288. See infra Parts II.C.1, ill. 
289. Schnapper, supra note 143, at 1259 n.225 (quoting Tom Clark) (alteration in original). 
290. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 294 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
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giving short shrift to independent agency concerns will be less likely to 
arise. Fourth, the Solicitor General will still present his views either explic-
itly or implicitly before the Court. Cases in which the Solicitor General 
remains silent will send a signal to the Court that he does not support the 
granting of certiorari; these signals are quite effective, as shown in a 1966 
study of Solicitor General-ICC relations.291 More significantly, the 
Solicitor General may express his views directly to the Court at either the 
certiorari or argument phase .. To ensure that the Solicitor General's views 
are presented to the Court, Congress could statutorily mandate his participa-
tion. Fifth, in presenting his views to the Court, the Solicitor General will 
not be encumbered by the need to balance independent agency perspectives 
in his litigation strategy. Instead, he may more easily wave the Executive 
Branch banner before the Court. 
The above projections are not merely idle speculation. The ICC, FEC, 
and FTC all possess authority to represent themselves before the Supreme 
Court. Their experiences with the Solicitor General and before the Court 
speak to the workability of a hybrid litigation scheme. 
1. The ICC 
ICC independent litigating authority dates back to 1910, with Congress 
reaffirming that authority in 1975.292 For the most part, the ICC and 
Solicitor General have worked cooperatively, preparing joint briefs in the 
majority of ICC cases before the Supreme Court. According to Erwin Gris-
wold, "in at least 85 percent of the cases [they] have been side by side.'>293 
Where differences exist, they sometimes involve disputes solely between 
the Solicitor General and the ICC. For example, in Henderson v. United 
States, 294 the Solicitor General successfully opposed a 1950 ICC rnling 
upholding racial segregation on railway dining cars. Solicitor General-ICC 
disputes more typically involve squabbles between the ICC and another 
governmental department or agency, with the Solicitor General weighing in 
on the side of the non-ICC interest. These disputes, which have involved 
the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Defense, feature such strangely 
named cases as United States v. ICC295 and United States v. United 
States. 296 The Solicitor General's position almost always prevails in these 
cases?97 
291. Brigman, supra note 104, at 134-41. 
292. See supra note 103. 
293. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 294 (testimony of Solicitor Geneml Erwin 
Griswold). 
294. 339 u.s. 816 (1950). 
295. 337 u.s. 426 (1949). 
296. 417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. National Classification Comm. v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 961 (1977). For a discussion of these and other similar cases, see Hcrz, supra note 16; 
Stern, supra note 10, at 760-63; Brigman, supra note 104, at 117-41. 
297. See Stern, supra note 10, at 761-62; Brigman, supra note 104, at 135-40. 
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The ICC and Solicitor General have both gained from this arrange-
ment. As stated above, the Solicitor General and the ICC work coopera-
tively in the vast majority of cases-including cases where other Executive 
Branch interests, such as the EPA, oppose the ICC.298 While the ICC 
gained a measure of independence, this arrangement hardly compromised 
the prestige of Solicitor General representation. Most significantly, when 
conflicts arise, the Solicitor General almost always comes out on top. The 
Solicitor General is also able to speak his mind on ICC cases without shut-
ting the courthouse doors to the agency. In one antitrust case, for example, 
the Solicitor General bluntly criticized the agency for not making the proper 
analysis and not keeping "its eyes open."299 Erwin Griswold's comment 
that ICC litigating authority was not "a major difficulty or problem"300 sug-
gests the Solicitor General's apparent contentment with this arrangement. 
2. The FTC 
Relations between the FfC and the Solicitor General also suggest that 
independent litigating authority improves independent agency representa-
tion before the Supreme Court without causing the Solicitor General "major 
difficulty." Congress granted the FfC independent litigating authority in 
the 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act. Rooted in the per-
ceived failure of the Department of Justice to represent FfC interests in 
court adequately, the Act authorized the FfC to defend agency orders 
before the Supreme Court whenever the Solicitor General declined to repre-
sent the Commission.301 However, this litigating authority has not undercut 
Solicitor General influence. The Solicitor General has proven himself to be 
298. In ICC v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 
(1973), the EPA sought to challenge an ICC order increasing freight rates. The EPA apparently agreed 
with SCRAP's claim that increasing freight rates would lead to a decrease in recyclable materials and, 
therefore, would harm the environment. See Davis, supra note 38, at 47-48. After the Solicitor General 
joined forces with the ICC in defending the freight increase, the EPA General Counsel wrote a letter to 
Solicitor General Robert Bork "requesting permission to submit to the Supreme Court the views of the 
Environment Protection Agency • . . [that] the environmental impact statement of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission [is insufficient.]" ld. at 48-49 (quoting Appellees' Supplemental Brief at lla, 
ICC v. SCRAP, 413 U.S. 917 (1973) (No. 72-535)). Solicitor General Bork rejected this request 
because "it appears EPA has no independent regulatory authority in regard to the actions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission ...• " ld. at 49 (quoting Appellees' Supplemental Brief at lOa, SCRAP (No. 
72-535)). Bork won both this battle with the EPA and the war over the ICC order, as the Supreme Court 
upheld the freight increase in SCRAP. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). For further discussion of this case, see 
Davis, supra note 38, at 47-50. 
299. Memorandum for the United States at 8, Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 386 U.S. 544 
(1967) (No. 638). For further discussion of this case, see Government Litigation in the Supreme Court, 
supra note 123, at 1461-62. 
300. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 293 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
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a respected advisor to the FTC on the cert-worthiness of its claims and a 
more earnest representative of FTC interests before the Court. 302 
This dynamic, in many respects, mirrors ICC-Solicitor General rela-
tions. Like the ICC, the Solicitor General and FTC rarely disagree with 
each other. In fact, unlike ICC orders which may adversely affect other 
governmental interests, the FTC has typically been in sync with White 
House preferences these past several years. 303 Conflicts which have arisen 
usually involve a case's cert-worthiness and not the substantive outcome 
desired by the FTC. With two exceptions, the FTC followed the Solicitor 
General's recommendations during this period. 304 The FTC heeded the 
Solicitor General sometimes because it agreed with him and sometimes 
because it thought the costs of litigating without the Solicitor General's 
backing were too high. These costs included the risk of damaging its liti-
gating capital by going to the Court too often, going to the Court without 
the benefit of Solicitor General representation, and harming its relationship 
with the Solicitor General's office. The FTC's adherence to Solicitor 
General advice suggests that the FTC recognized that the added value of 
Solictor General representation was so significant that the agency felt 
severely constrained in appearing before the Supreme Court without it. 
The two cases that the FTC initially pursued without Solicitor General 
counsel have also defined the status of Solicitor General-FTC relations. 
One case, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 305 concerned the type of 
proof necessary to establish a conspiratorial restraint of trade; the other 
case, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 306 concerned whether a 
boycott for greater compensation by court-appointed lawyers should be 
considered political speech warranting First Amendment protection. The 
Solicitor General, although unwilling to petition the Court on the FTC's 
behalf, did not disagree with the FTC on the merits in either case. The 
Solicitor General simply thought the cases undeserving of Supreme Court 
consideration.307 Despite this belief, the Solicitor General did not seek to 
hinder Court consideration by opposing the FTC's petition. In both 
instances, to the surprise of the FTC and Solicitor General,308 the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. Once certiorari was granted, the Solicitor General 
302. Interviews with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4, and Tom Merrill, supra note 5, were 
particularly helpful in understanding the present-day dynamic between the Solicitor General's office and 
the FrC. 
303. See Roger E. Schechter, A Retrospective on the Reagan FTC: Musings on the Role of an 
Administrative Agency, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 489, 489-500 (1990) (describing the Reagan 
Administration's ideological domination of the FrC). 
304. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 1 n.1, FrC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-1198); Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 1 n.l, FrC v. 
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (No. 84-1809). 
305. 476 u.s. 447 {1986). 
306. 493 u.s. 411 (1990). 
307. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
308. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
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worked with the FTC in preparing the cases.3°9 Yet, since the FTC had 
been granted certiorari by its own rights, it called the shots on presenting 
the cases to the Court. 
The FTC's lead role apparently did not sit well with the Solicitor 
General's office. Because he represents the government in a wide range of 
cases, the Solicitor General-even when he agrees with the outcome 
desired by a particular agency-frames a case to balance how best to pres-
ent that case to the Court with his long-range litigation strategy. The 
FTC's success in Indiana Federation of Dentists and Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n allowed the FTC to frame its own arguments. 
Consequently, the Solicitor General faced the choice of advocating FTC 
positions at the certiorari stage or declining participation in a case and risk-
ing a successful independent FTC cert petition. This, according to FTC 
officials, is what occurred in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 310 a case 
determining the necessary degree of state supervision of anticompetitive 
conduct for private actors to claim immunity from FTC antitrust enforce-
ment. By petitioning the Court for certiorari and then representing the FTC 
throughout the litigation, the Solicitor General exercised significant control 
in defining the case.311 
Pressure to seek certiorari in cases such as Ticor and Indiana 
Federation of Dentists does not significantly inconvenience the Solicitor 
General. After all, the Solicitor General agrees with the agency on the mer-
its in these cases but decides not to seek certiorari. The FTC experience 
suggests that such cases occur few and far between. Moreover, were the 
Solicitor General and FTC unable to come to terms over the government's 
position, the Solicitor General would remain free to file a supplemental 
brief explaining his views. In the end, the Solicitor General-FTC experi-
ence has been successful. Although the dynamic is more complex, the pres-
tige and influence of the Solicitor General remain high. That the FTC 
almost always decides on its own to do what the Solicitor General recom-
mends suggests that the Solicitor General has gained in persuasive power 
what he has lost in statutory authority. 
3. The FEC 
The limited FEC experience tells a far different story. In Buckley v. 
Valeo, 312 the Department of Justice and FEC fought over the Commission's 
very existence. The dispute centered on Congress' decision to split the 
309. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 
(1986) (No. 84-1809); Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-1198). 
310. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). Department of Justice officials do not necessarily subscribe to this 
accounting. See supra note 106. 
311. See Brief for Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) 
(No. 91-72). 
312. 425 u.s. 946 (1976). 
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power to appoint FEC commissioners between Congress and the President. 
Attorney General Edward Levi thought that this mixed-appointment scheme 
was unconstitutional and that the Department of Justice had no obligation to 
consider FEC interests since "the Commission is an agency dominated by 
Congress."313 FEC Chairman Tom Curtis strongly disputed Levi's conclu-
sions. Although the FEC was statutorily empowered to represent itself 
before the Supreme Court,314 Curtis pleaded with the Attorney General to 
provide "a spirited and wholehearted defense of this legislation"315 and 
"state[d] as forcefully" as he possibly could that the Attorney General's 
position was "dangerously wrong."316 Indeed, Curtis complained both to 
the White House and to congressional leadership about Levi's handling of 
the case.317 Curtis' efforts to strongarm the Department of Justice did not 
succeed. The Department of Justice and FEC f:tled separate briefs before 
the Supreme Court on this question;318 the Department of Justice position 
prevailed, forcing a drastic reworking of FEC statutory responsibilities.319 
Without independent litigating authority, the FEC would not have had 
its views represented in court. In plain terms, the interests of both the 
Attorney General (who could advocate his position without fear of provok-
ing political reprisals in Congress) and the FEC (which could have repre-
sentation as a party in the case) were served by dual representation. The 
eventual repudiation of the FEC' s position does not undermine this conclu-
sion-as the saying goes, it is better to have litigated and lost than never to 
have litigated at all. Indeed, the feud between Curtis and Levi in part 
313. Letter from Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, to Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal 
Election Commission (June 12, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 125. 
314. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437e(f)(4), 437d(a)(6), (b) (1988); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a), 9040(a) (1988). 
315. Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to Edward H. Levi, 
Attorney General (May 27, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 121. 
316. Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to Edward H. Levi, 
Attorney General (June 5, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 122. 
317. See Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to President 
Gerald R. Ford (June 9, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 124-25; Letter 
from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to James G. Abourezk, Chninnan, 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 12, 1975), reprinted in 
Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 130. 
318. See Brief of the Federal Election Commission at 6, Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976) 
(No. 75-436) ("This brief defends the legitimacy of the means chosen by Congress to establish the 
Federal Election Commission (the method of appointment) ... [because] the Constitution confers upon 
the Congress broad and pervasive responsibilities in relation to the federal electoral process ••.• "); Brief 
for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Buckley (No. 75-
436) ('Tf]he grant of enforcement powers to the Federal Election Commission is unconstitutional .••. 
Most of its members are appointed by Congress .... Just as the executive branch cannot make the laws, 
so Congress (or its delegate, the Commission) cannot enforce them."). 
319. Sections 437c(f)(4) and 437d(a)(6) and (b) were modified by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), and §§ 9010(a) and 9040(a) were modified by the 
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 563. 
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prompted the establishment of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel to ensure 
institutional representation of legislative interests before the Court. 320 
* * * * 
The experiences of the ICC, FTC, and FEC suggest that grants of liti-
gating authority improve independent agency representation before the 
Supreme Court without substantially undermining Solicitor General author-
ity. The fear expressed by Erwin Griswold that extending independent liti-
gating authority to "12 or 15 agencies ... would seriously affect the 
handling of the Government's legal work before the Supreme Court"321 is 
unlikely to be realized. Built-in restraints are likely to offset the so-called 
"commons problem" of each independent agency overvaluing the impor-
tance of its own cases, thereby disregarding the cautionary Solicitor General 
and flooding an already overburdened Supreme Court with certiorari 
petitions. 322 
Independent agencies gain a good deal from Solicitor General repre-
sentation. The Solicitor General wins roughly three fourths of his cases 
because of his care in selecting cases, 323 his experience in presenting them, 
and his reputation before the Supreme Court. Independent agencies recog-
nize that victory is less likely without the Solicitor General and that main-
taining good relations with this powerful advocate is critically important. 324 
Consequently, when the Solicitor General recommends against seeking cer-
tiorari, independent agency counsel will likely listen. The FTC's decision 
to seek certiorari on its own only twice in more than a decade exemplifies 
independent agency self-restraint and suggests that fears of a Supreme 
Court litigation explosion are exaggerated. 
When conflicts between the Solicitor General and independent agen-
cies do arise, however, the power to go it alone can be critically important 
to independent agencies. In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, independent 
litigating authority enabled the FEC to fight for its institutional life. The 
Solicitor General is not ill-served by this arrangement Without the hin-
drance of competing independent agency interests, he may be better able to 
advance his favored position. Other times, in order to retain control of a 
case, he will feel compelled to heed independent agency wishes. On bal-
ance, especially since independent agencies are desirous of his counsel and 
320. Interview with Mort Rosenberg, supra note 6. The FEC continues to make use of its self-
representation authority. In 1993, for example, the Commission unsuccessfuily petitioned the Court in a 
dispute with Lyndon LaRouche. See Brief for the Federal Election Commission in Support of 
Certiorari, FEC v. LaRouche, 114 S. Ct 550 (1993) (No. 93-519). 
321. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 293-94 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
322. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geiler, supra note 5; Interview 
with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4. 
323. See SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 126-30 (focusing on Solicitor General Griswold), 145-50. 
324. For an argument that independent agency counsel may be nearly as good and in some cases 
better than their counterparts in the Solicitor General's office, see Lochner, supra note 176, at 572-73. 
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solicitous of his recommendations, the Solicitor General's influence would 
not be significantly reduced under FTC-type hybrid arrangements. 
The real question seems to be one of power. If independent agencies 
should be limited in their ability to reach conclusions at odds with the 
Executive Branch, then centralizing litigating authority within the 
Department of Justice seems appropriate. If independent agencies are to 
have an independent voice, avoiding the risk of suppressing that voice out-
weighs confronting the unproven and quite speculative risk that Solicitor 
General authority will be undermined through a hybrid litigation scheme. 
C. The Solicitor General as Protector of the Supreme Court 
Centralizing government litigating authority before the Supreme Court 
involves more than the question of whom the Solicitor General represents 
and how well he represents them. It also concerns the needs of the Supreme 
Court. Proponents of centralization speak both of fears that the Court is ill-
equipped to resolve disputes involving multiple governmental presentations 
and the valuable screening function the Solicitor General performs for the 
Court by controlling the filing of certiorari petitions. These arguments for 
centralization are forceful. Undoubtedly, centralized control of government 
litigation simplifies the Court's task of deciding whether to hear a case and 
determining whether the government's position is correct Otherwise, the 
Court would sometimes have to choose between opposing governmental 
assessments of a case's cert-worthiness and merits. Fears of decentraliza-
tion are nevertheless overstated. The Supreme Court is quite capable of 
managing intragovernmental disputes. The screening function performed 
by the Solicitor General, moreover, is not contingent on plenary Solicitor 
General control over governmental litigation. 
1. lntragovemmental Disputes Before the Supreme Court 
Agency counsel, Department of Justice officials, Supreme Court 
Justices, and members of Congress join the Solicitor General in proclaiming 
that it is certainly unbecoming and quite possibly destructive to have con-
flicting governmental interests presented before the Supreme Court. Their 
argument is typically not about some constitutional demand that the unitary 
executive speak as one voice for all of government before the Court 325 The 
argument, instead, focuses on the difficulty that the Court would have in 
325. Some advocates of Department of Justice centralization do claim that the Executive Branch is 
''unitary" and, therefore, that it needs to speak in a single voice. See The Attorney Geneml's Role as 
Chief Litigator, supra note 49. At the same time, many proponents of the "unitary executive" pay little 
attention to the Department of Justice centralization issue. See, e.g., DouGLAS W. KMmc, THB 
ArroRNEY GENERAL's LAWYER: INsiDE THE MEESE Jusnca DEPARTMENT 47-68 (1992) (omitting the 
issue of Department of Justice centralization from his otherwise excellent discussion of how the 
President asserts power over the Executive Branch). 
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sorting out such conflicts and in comprehending governmental arguments 
made by lawyers outside the Solicitor General's control. 
The pervasiveness of this belief is nearly overwhelming. One general 
counsel endorsed centralization before the Supreme Court because 
"[w]ithout coordination ... the Court might well be faced with conflicting 
or even diametrically opposed views of different branches of Government 
on specific questions, which would be intolerable."326 An Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum suggested that the Solicitor General "protects the 
Court" in presenting "a single, coherent position."327 Solicitors General 
agree with this assessment, arguing that multiple independent agency 
presentations on a single legal issue "would border on the chaotic."328 
Supreme Court Justices, too, support a unified governmental presentation. 
In response to a congressional inquiry regarding the consequences of 
extending to the SEC the right to petition the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger expressed ''the unanimous view of the Justices that it would 
be unwise to dilute the authority of the Solicitor General as to Supreme 
Court jurisdiction in cases arising within the Executive Branch and 
independent agencies."329 Individual Justices have also complained at oral 
argument about independent agency cases where the Solicitor General does 
not present a unified governmental position. 330 
Although Justices may prefer a cleaner, unified government presenta-
tion over the more complex and chaotic litigation that could result from 
independent agency litigating authority, the suggestion that the Supreme 
Court is somehow ill-equipped to face this hydra is a bit surprising. 
Independent agencies and the Department of Justice often air intragovem-
mental conflicts before lower federal courts of appeals.331 No one, how-
ever, has endorsed centralized litigating authority to spare federal appellate 
court judges the confusion of conflicting governmental presentations in 
326. Stem, supra note 3, at 217 (quoting anonymous General Counsel). 
327. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 230-31. 
328. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
329. Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, to John E. Moss, Chairman, 
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Fmance (Nov. 9, 1971) [hereinafter Letter from Chief Justice 
Burger to Congressman Moss], reprinted in Study of the Securities Industry: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1809-10 (1971). 
330. Justice Felix Frankfurter complained in the St. Regis case: "How do you expect us to decide 
this matter if you can't even get an agreement inside the Justice Department?" Brigman, supra note 
104, at 155 (quoting Justice Frankfurter). For further discussion of St. Regis, see supra text 
accompanying notes 79-81. 
331. Numerous examples of these cases can be found in Herz, supra note 16. Some of these cases 
include: United States v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1989); Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving a suit brought by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service and others against the FERC); United States v. Federal Maritime Cornrn'n, 694 
F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 203-08 
(discussing Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC). 
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their courts. It is unlikely that Supreme Court Justices would be less able to 
deal with such conflicts. 
The Supreme Court, in fact, has never suggested that it could not 
effectively resolve multiple government presentations. The record supports 
just the opposite: the Supreme Court is comfortably resigned to adjudicat-
ing dual government presentations. Having had a considerable number of 
intragovernmental disputes presented before it, the Supreme Court is clearly 
familiar with and hardly phased by this practice. The few statements of 
disapproval found in oral argument transcripts are of little significance; the 
Court has described this practice as "not a rarity."332 
Supreme Court acquiescence to dual government representation 
extends not just to independent agencies but to cases involving competing 
interests within the Executive Branch. In TV A v. Hill, the Solicitor General 
appended to his brief supporting TV A efforts to construct the Tellico Dam a 
Department of Interior memorandum claiming that Endangered Species Act 
protection of the snail darter prohibited the dam's construction.333 In 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, a brief filed on behalf 
of the EEOC, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Departments of 
Labor and Defeuse raised concerns about the Massachusetts' veterans' pref-
erence scheme that were neglected by the Solicitor General.334 A more 
striking example appeared in Bob Jones University v. United States, where 
the Solicitor General successfully requested that the Court appoint counsel 
to represent the Treasury Department's position denying tax breaks to racist 
schools while the Department of Justice separately argued that, until 
Congress passed specific legislation on the issue, racist schools were enti-
tled to tax breaks.335 The Court's compliance with this unorthodox request, 
as well as its willingness to allow intraexecutive disputes to be presented to 
it in Hill aud Feeney, suggest that the Court recognizes that the Executive 
Branch sometimes behaves more like a conglomeration of divergent and 
occasionally antagonistic concerns than as a unitary voice. 
The Court, nevertheless, has not spoken definitively on the issue of 
whether suits can be maintained between different parts of the Executive 
Branch-for instance, the EPA bringing an enforcement action against the 
Department of Energy.336 Bob Jones University, Feeney, and Hill all 
332. Oral Argument Transcript at 33, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-
1701). 
333. See Brief for the Petitioner at 1a-13a, Appendix: Views of the Secretary of the Interior, Hill 
(No. 76-1701). 
334. See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of the Office of Personnel Management, the United 
States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Labor, and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (No. 78-
233). 
335. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13. 
336. See generally Herz, supra note 16; Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal 
Agencies?, 17 EcoLOGY L.Q. 317 (1990). 
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involved a "nongovernmental 'real party in interest' "337 who could sepa-
rately maintain the lawsuit against the principal governmental defendant. A 
more vivid example of an intraexecutive dispute is United States v. 
Nixon. 338 In opposing executive-controlled efforts by the special prosecu-
tor to gain access to the Nixon tapes, 339 the President's counsel claimed that 
"[t]his entire dispute, between two entities within the executive branch" is 
non justiciable because Article IT of the Constitution vests ''ultimate author-
ity over all executive branch decisions ... in the President."340 While rec-
ognizing that the dispute was indeed between a subordinate and superior 
officer of the Executive Branch (suggesting that Nixon could fire Leon 
Jaworski just as he fired Archibald Cox), the Court nonetheless ruled 
against Nixon. Noting the presence of "concrete adverseness,"341 the Court 
stated that "[t]he mere assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch dispute,' 
without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability 
does not depend on such a surface inquiry."342 It is unclear whether the 
Court interpreted Nixon to embrace a "real party in interest'' standard or, 
instead, simply insisted that "the issues were of the sort which are tradition-
ally justiciable and ... the setting assured concrete adverseness."343 
The Court's handling of intraexecutive disputes suggests that the Court 
does not demand that the Executive Branch act as a singular entity. This 
recognition of a multidimensional government is quite apparent in the case 
of independent agencies. Disputes between the Solicitor General and 
independent agencies can sometimes be seen in certiorari petitions, briefs, 
and oral arguments. In fact, the Court has even chided the Solicitor General 
in some of its opinions for not reporting conflicting government views. In 
Connecticut v. Teal, Justice Brennan's majority opinion took note of the 
fact that the EEOC, "which shares responsibility [with the Department of 
337. Proposed Tax Assessment Against the United States Postal Service, I Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
79, 83 (1977) (assessing the justiciability of a dispute between the Postal Service and the IRS). The 
Reagan Administration likewise endorsed this "real party iu interest" standard in opposing EPA 
enforcement actions against another federal agency. See Memorandum from John M. Harmon, 
Assistant Attorney General, to Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General 5-8 (June 23, 1978), 
reprinted in Compliance Hearing, supra note 66, at 668, 672-75. The Bush Administration, not 
surprisingly, also endorsed this real party in interest standard. See Memorandum of Understanding on 
Civil Enforcement Between the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, supra 
note 68. 
338. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For a commentary on the justiciability of Nixon, see Philip B. Kurland, 
United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REv. 68, 71-72 (1974). 
339. The Nixon litigation, of course, predated the Ethics in Goverrunent Act's creation of 
independent counsels insulated from the Executive Branch. The independence of special prosecutor 
Leon Jaworski, who handled the Nixon litigation, hinged on regulations promulgated (and repealable) by 
the Attorney General. See Briefforthe United States at 17, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 
(No. 73-1766) (arguing that such regulations ensured a "concrete controversy''). 
340. Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States at 
28, Nixon (No. 73-1766). 
341. 418 U.S. at 697 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
342. Id. at 693. 
343. Herz, supra note 16, at 969. 
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Justice] for federal enforcement of Title VII"344 declined to join the 
Department of Justice's brief. In Sheet Metal Workers, Justice Brennan's 
plurality opinion likewise signalled his recognition that the Solicitor 
General's office had de facto overruled the EEOC, noting that "throughout 
this litigation, [the EEOC] joined the other plaintiffs in asking the courts to 
order [the] numerical goals [it now opposes]."345 
The Court also recognizes the propriety of lawsuits launched by 
independent agencies against the Executive Branch and vice versa. 
Lawsuits between the Federal Power Commission and the Department of 
Interior,346 the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of 
Agriculture, 347 the Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, 348 the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Department of Justice,349 and other 
combinations have been found justiciable.350 The best known of these 
cases is United States v. ICC, 351 a 1949 case concerning a Department of 
Justice challenge to the ICC's rejection of a Department of Army complaint 
against unreasonable railroad rates. The ICC sought to have the case dis-
missed because "the United States was both plaintiff and defendant and 
[the case,] therefore, was one presenting no actual case or controversy."352 
The Department of Justice attacked this intragovemmental fiction, arguing 
that "some determinations made by the Commission, an independent gov-
ernmental agency, will be regarded as erroneous by the highest legal 
officers of the Govemment."353 In other words, since independent agencies 
are free to make decisions at odds with the Executive Branch, the 
Department of Justice reasoned that it is improper to invoke an intragovem-
mental fiction to shield those decisions from the courts. "[S]ubstance, not 
form, is controlling."354 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "courts 
must look behind the names that symbolize the parties to determine whether 
a justiciable case or controversy is presented."355 
The Court could not have held otherwise without contradicting the 
1935 Humphrey's Executor56 decision that affirmed the constitutionality of 
344. 457 U.S. 440, 451 n.ll (1982). 
345. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 n.24 (1986). 
346. See Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); United States ex rei Chapman v. 
Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953). 
347. Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954). 
348. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
349. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). These decisions are both cited in Nixon to support 
the Court's conclusion that Nixon is justiciable. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). 
350. Most of the examples listed above and several others are mentioned in Herz, supra note 16. 
351. 337 u.s. 426 (1949). 
352. Brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission at 21, United States v. lCC, 337 U.S. 426 
(1949) (No. 330). 
353. Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. ICC (No. 330) (emphasis added). 
354. /d. at 11. 
355. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 430. 
356. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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independent regulatory agencies. In that case, the Court had validated 
administrative decisionmaking outside complete Executive Branch control 
and, with it, the possibility of a truly adversarial policy dispute within the 
government. If this intragovernmental dispute were nonjusticiable, one 
wonders whether controversies between the legislative and executive 
branches over the constitutionality of legislation or between the judiciary 
and the executive over the enforcement of subpoenas would be similarly 
non justiciable. 
United States v. ICC, however, is more than the justiciability counter-
part to Humphrey's Executor. Its emphasis on "substance, not form" sug-
gests that the Court recognizes that governmental operations are organized 
in a seemingly endless variety of shapes and forms. One of the forms vali-
dated by the Court was regulation outside the control of the President. 
Once the Court legitimized independent agencies, it was to be expected that 
the Court would facilitate their independence by approving their participa-
tion in litigation. Inevitably, some of that litigation would involve the 
Executive Branch. That some of that litigation would occur before the 
Supreme Court was also inevitable. The notion that the Court somehow is 
poorly served or confused by dual governmental representation is mis-
guided. The Court has invited this dual representation. 
2. The Solicitor General as Gatekeeper 
Supporters of Solicitor General control of government Supreme Court 
litigation most commonly argue that the Solicitor General's screening of 
governmental cases "guard[s] the door to the Supreme Court, to make sure 
that only the most important cases are appealed."357 This vision of the 
Solicitor General as the Court's erstwhile gatekeeper is so prevalent that a 
principal focus of Solicitor General scholarship has been to sort out "the 
conflicting obligations of the Solicitor General"358 as "an officer and an 
advocate."359 More significantly, Solicitors General, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court have all given credence to this gatekeeper function in their 
words and deeds. Solicitors General see themselves as "first-line gate-
keeper[s]"360 and accordingly defend centralization because "[s]uch 
control insures that the government presents to the Supreme Court only 
those cases that meet the Court's own exacting standards for review ."361 
Under this view, formally embraced by the Carter Justice Department, "as 
an officer of the Court," the Solicitor General "protects the Court's docket 
357. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 737 (quoting former Deputy Solicitor General Ken Geller). 
358. Eric Schnapper so titled his article: "Becket at the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the 
Solicitor General." Schnapper, supra note 143. 
359. Richard Wilkins so titled his article: "An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor 
General." Wilkins, supra note 143. 
360. McCree, supra note 162, at 341. 
361. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
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by screening the Government's cases and relieving the Court of the burden 
of reviewing unmeritorious claims."362 
The Solicitor General and Department of Justice preserve power 
through this argument and have great incentive to make this claim. That 
Congress and the Supreme Court likewise embrace this view is all the more 
significant. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs endorsed 
Solicitor General coordination of Supreme Court litigation to ensure that 
the Court would not be "overburdened by requests for certiorari filed by the 
Government."363 The Supreme Court in 1971 likewise spoke out against 
the expansion of independent agency litigating authority, expressing its 
unanimous view that "the Solicitor General exercises a highly important 
role in the selection of cases to be brought [before the Court] in terms of 
the long-range public interest."364 Moreover, in its 1988 Providence 
Journal decision, the Court suggested that "[w]ithout the centralization of 
the decision whether to seek certiorari, [it] might well be deluged with 
petitions from every federal prosecutor, agency, or instrumentality."365 
Solicitor General and Supreme Court conduct reveals that both entities 
take seriously this gatekeeper role. The Solicitor General seeks certiorari in 
roughly five to fifteen percent of the cases presented to him. In the 1984 
term, for example, certiorari was sought in only forty-three of the several 
hundred cases sent to the Solicitor General by departments, agencies, and 
divisions.366 For its part, the Supreme Court follows the Solicitor General's 
lead. From 1959-1989, Solicitors General successfully obtained certiorari 
in almost seventy percent of the 1294 cases they presented to the Court.367 
Private litigants, in contrast, succeeded in only about five percent of their 
cases.368 
As gatekeeper, the Solicitor General surely pays attention to many of 
the indicia of cert-worthiness that the Supreme Court has itself identified.369 
The Solicitor General must also balance concerns far removed from the 
standard criteria for cert-worthiness, including policy objectives of the 
Department of Justice and the White House, desires of affected governmen-
tal interests, and the risk of legislative intervention. These competing con-
cerns explain the Solicitor General's unsuccessful efforts to oppose 
certiorari in two critical affirmative action cases-Metro Broadcasting and 
362. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 231. 
363. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 66. The Governmental Affairs 
Committee, however, did recommend that all independent agencies be allowed to "petition the Supreme 
Court to review adverse decisions of lower courts." Id. at 66-67. 
364. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Congressman Moss, supra note 329. 
365. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988). 
366. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 114. 
367. I d. at 25. 
368. ld. 
369. The Court has identified such factors as conflicts among federal courts, conflicts between state 
and federal courts, departures from applicable Supreme Court precedents, and important questions of 
federal law. See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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Sheet Metal Workers. In each case, the Solicitor General disagreed with the 
independent agency's support of affirmative action but feared the backlash 
that might ensue if he reversed the agency's position. 37° Concerns outside 
the Supreme Court's objective criteria might also explain the Solicitor 
General's decision to seek certiorari in Ticor rather than let the FfC man-
age the litigation.371 
Solicitors General Fried and Starr should not be faulted for their inter-
jection of political concerns in the handling of these cases. After all, the 
Solicitor General must operate within the delegation of authority granted 
him by the Attorney General. During the Carter years, that delegation was 
quite broad. Attorney General Bell spoke proudly of how he insulated the 
Solicitor General from the White House, and his Office of Legal Counsel 
issued a memorandum opinion defending Solicitor General indepen-
dence.372 During the Reagan years, a greater attempt was made to coordi-
nate Solicitor General action with Attorney General preferences. Daily 
meetings were scheduled, and Attorney General delegates frequently lob-
bied the Solicitor General.373 Whatever the scope of the delegation, how-
ever, the Solicitor General will be influenced by political concerns. 
The Court, undonbtedly, is aware that the Solicitor General exists 
within a political culture and that he must be influenced by it. 374 However, 
the Solicitor General's frequent appearances before the Court, his need to 
preserve good relations with the Court as part of his litigation strategy, and 
a sense of duty that many Solicitors General feel towards the Court warrant 
some degree of solicitude by the Court towards the Solicitor General. This 
solicitude, coupled with the deference the Court accords a coequal branch 
of government, supports the preservation of the Solicitor General's gate-
keeper function. 
The question remains whether the gatekeeper function can be main-
tained while allowing independent agencies greater litigating authority 
before the Court. The answer is yes. The Solicitor General is always free 
to express his opinion on a case's cert-worthiness. The Solicitor General's 
assessment of a case does not become less persuasive simply because an 
independent agency speaks its own voice before the Court. Indeed, as 
stated above, Congress could ensure Solicitor General participation at the 
certiorari stage by mandating that the Solicitor General be a statutory liti-
gant in all cases involving the government. Alternatively, the Court, 
acknowledging that the gatekeeper function supposedly is performed on its 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 224-31 (discussing Metro Broadcasting), 253-58 
(discussing Sheet Metal Workers). 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11. 
372. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 47-50; Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138. 
373. See generally FRIED, supra note 7, at 40-44; CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 51-64 (focusing on the 
Bob Jones litigation), 81-115, 135-54. 
374. For a discussion of the Court's recognition that the Solicitor General changes position when 
there is a new president, see supra note 170. 
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behalf, may itself ask the Solicitor General to comment on the cert-worthi-
ness of independent agency litigation. 375 
Nonetheless, allowing independent agencies to petition the Court sepa-
rately would somewhat diminish the Solicitor General's power since he 
could not maintain a veto over independent agency litigation. In certain 
instances, however, the Solicitor General used that veto to keep a case out 
of court on the merits and not because the case lacked cert-worthiness. 376 
Merits-based decisionmaking of this nature is at odds with the gatekeeper 
function, namely, to assist the Court in identifying cases worth hearing on 
the merits. Consequently, enhanced independent agency litigating authority 
better enables the Supreme Court to understand which cases the Solicitor 
General opposes on the merits and which cases he opposes for failure to 
meet measures of cert-worthiness. In other words, independent litigating 
authority may well serve and would be unlikely to hinder the gatekeeper 
function performed by the Solicitor General. 
* * * * 
Centralization arguments rooted in the needs of the Supreme Court are 
exaggerated. While centralization does ensure a cleaner presentation of a 
smaller number of cases, its benefits are somewhat illusory. The Court is 
relatively untroubled by conflicting governmental presentation and Solicitor 
General input is not contingent on centralization. However, the costs of 
centralization to independent agencies are significant. As Robert Stern 
observed some forty years ago: 
[When conflict arises,] determination by the judiciary is often more 
satisfactory than an effort by the Department of Justice to force its 
own views on the disagreeing [independent] agency by refusing to 
present the agency's position to the courts. The Attorney General 
has no authority to give binding legal advice to the independent 
agencies. Only the judiciary has authority to give the conclusive 
answer to the question in dispute. 377 
This analysis, however, does not address the question of whether there 
should be governmental agencies able to reach policy conclusions at odds 
with the President. It presupposes that independent agencies are empow-
ered to speak their own voice. 
375. The Court now asks the Solicitor General several times each year to provide his views on a 
matter before the Court. Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5. There is no reason to think that nn 
alteration in independent agency litigating authority will make the Court less likely to seek Solicitor 
General counsel. 
376. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. 
SEC, 496 U.S. 936 (1990); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 
(1986). 
377. Stem, supra note 10, at 769. 
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By creating independent agencies, Congress has sought to insulate 
some regulatory decisionmaking from the control of elected government. 
Although the President has power to submit budget requests, name the 
chairman, and appoint at least some commissioners as well as key staffers, 
"[t]he multiple membership of these agencies, with terms expiring at stag-
gered intervals, does tend to serve as a buffer against Presidential control 
and direction.'7378 Limiting presidential control, however, does not mean 
that independent agencies are mouthpieces for Congress.379 Indeed, rank-
ing majority and minority leadership of several Senate committees have 
proclaimed that the final word on independent agency decisionmaking is to 
be spoken by Article ill judges. A joint letter to President Carter expressed 
this sentiment, arguing that "in exercising the quasi-judicial and quasi-legis-
lative authority which Congress had delegated to the agencies, agency 
actions shall not be subject to review or modification by either Congress or 
the Executive; only the courts may review final agency actions."380 
Independent agencies, according to Congress, are supposed to reach 
policy determinations according to their own dictates. In these circum-
stances, where Congress wants a voice within government freed from presi-
dential control, grants of independent litigating authority are perfectly 
sensible. Because these independent agencies, on occasion, will find them-
selves at odds with the White House, the Department of Justice should be 
able neither to compel these agencies to advocate in court a position with 
which they disagree nor to foreclose their access to the Supreme Court by 
refusing to seek certiorari on their behalf. 
Congress has not followed its own design, however. Rather than 
empower independent agencies with independent litigating authority, 
Congress has crafted an extraordinarily incoherent system of unpredictably 
varying degrees of litigating authority. Some agencies are virtually 
independent; others entirely dependent; and most somewhere in the mid-
dle. 381 Specific political circumstances, not cohesive thinking about the 
378. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 75. 
379. Independent agencies are sometimes depicted as "arm[s] of Congress." ld. at 31. As one 
Senator put it: '"The commissions, if I may risk oversimplification, are ours." ld. (quoting Senator 
Hart). 
380. Letter from Bipartisan Senate Leadership to President Jimmy Carter 3 (Dec. 16. 1977), 
reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170, 172 (1981); see also Olson, 
supra note 10, at 86 (discussing the view that courts should review agency actions). 
381. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37. 
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attributes of independent agency autonomy, explain this patchwork 
structure. 382 
To expect that Congress would have a coherent vision of the structure 
and purposes of independent agencies is perhaps to expect the impossible. 
The Senate Committee on Governmental Operations admitted as much, cas-
ually noting that "[a] decision on structure is after all a political issue, very 
much influenced by the prevailing political situation. And that situation can 
neither be quantified nor predicted."383 It is not surprising that "random 
selection"384 may explain Congress' choice of an independent over an exec-
utive format. The confluence of oversight committee preferences, interest 
group pressures, and legislative-executive relations inevitably yields differ-
ent organizational structures. In the end, the only certainty about independ-
ent agencies is that they are multimember bodies headed by individuals who 
cannot be appointed or removed "at will" by the President. 
Congress' failure to articulate why it sometimes prefers the independ-
ent agency model has resulted in allocations of authority with little rhyme 
and less reason.385 This incoherency is present with respect to concerns of 
both subject matter authority and structure. On matters of substance, for 
example, regulation of the banking industry, antitrust enforcement, and 
employment discrimination prosecutions are concurrently managed by both 
the executive and independent agencies.386 On the matters of structure, 
some independent agencies are free of, and others very much dependent on, 
the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget. 
The haphazard nature of independent litigating authority is certainly 
expected.387 Since the independent agency structure is far from pre-
ordained,388 Congress' decision to make some independent agencies more 
dependent on the Executive Branch than others seems an acceptable state of 
affairs. Nonetheless, there is something unsettling about Department of 
Justice control of independent agency litigating authority. Granted, 
Congress may confine the substance and scope of independent agency 
action either by limiting the sweep of independent agency jurisdiction or by 
382. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94 (discussing reasons why Congress approved FfC 
authority to represent itself before the Supreme Court but refused to give similar power to the SEC). 
383. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 79. 
384. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DuKB L.J. 257, 258. 
385. See Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 16, at 72-73; Verkuil, supra note 384, at 258-
59. 
386. See Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 16, at 72-73. 
387. This haphazard nature proves fatal for those who demand that "[d]eviations from the classical 
model of separation of powers ... be justified by sufficiently compelling considerations of policy." /d. 
at 72. 
388. The first independent agency, the ICC, was not designed to be independent. Instead, 
Democrats in Congress apparently altered the ICC structu~ in response to the pending presidentinl 
inauguration of Republican railroad lawyer Benjamin Harrison. Id. at 75. This legislative history 
supports the conclusion that "the concept of the independent commission arose from a desire by 
Congress to insulate the agency from Presidential influence." STUDY oN Fso£RAL RsoULATION, supra 
note 60, at 28. 
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empowering the President with great authority to influence independent 
agency decisionmaking. Yet, once the initial policy decision is made, the 
agency should be free to defend its position. If not, limits on litigating 
authority may well force an independent agency to sit idly by and watch the 
Department of Justice abandon the agency's publicly stated position. This 
is precisely what happened to the SEC in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
litigation, to the FCC in League of Women Voters, and to the EEOC in 
Sheet Metal Workers. 389 
The prospect of Department of Justice domination of independent 
agency decisionmaking does not seem to trouble Congress. Some 
independent agencies have no litigating authority. Moreover, with only 
three clear exceptions,39° Congress has left it to the Solicitor General to 
represent independent agency interests before the Supreme Court. If 
Congress truly intends independent agencies to be able to reach policy deci-
sions at odds with the White House, the current arrangement is at best 
counterproductive. The Solicitor General's loyalty is first owed to the 
President and Attorney General and then to the affected agencies.391 
Perhaps Congress should not be judged too harshly for giving an 
Executive Branch official, and not the courts, the last word in reviewing 
independent agency decisionmaking. After all, bureaucratic folklore treats 
the Solicitor General as somehow removed from the confmes of White 
House politics. However, Congress' jerry-rigged approach to independent 
litigating authority before the lower federal courts suggests a more perva-
sive legislative insensitivity to whether independent agencies speak their 
own voice in court. 
Congress' insensitivity to the independent litigating issue, however, 
does not answer the question of whether centralization or decentralization 
of litigating authority is good public policy. The argument for centraliza-
tion, at least as applied to executive departments and agencies, is persua-
sive. Centralization of litigating authority within the Department of Justice 
provides a chief mechanism by which the Executive Branch can coordinate 
governmental decisionmaking. With most government policy subject to 
court challenge, Department of Justice control over litigation is a funda-
mental attribute of presidential power. Were Congress to empower all gov-
ernmental entities with independent litigating authority, presidential control 
of the Executive Branch would suffer a serious, perhaps fatal, blow. As the 
Attorney General has noted, there is a "responsibility to ensure that the 
interests of the United States as a whole, as articulated by the Executive, 
389. See supra text accompanying notes 203-09 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange), 211-16 (League 
of Women Voters), 253-58 (Sheet Metal Workers). 
390. These exceptions are the ICC, FTC and FEC. See supra Part II.B. 
391. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69. 
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are given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests 
between subordinate segments of the government."392 
Centralization is about much more than the preservation of presidential 
authority. The President is accountable to a national electorate; administra-
tive agencies are "unelected, bureaucratic, [and] fragmented."393 By 
reducing intragovernmental disputes, centralization is also more likely to 
result in more coordinated, more efficient policymaking. 394 Centralization 
of litigating authority is not without its pitfalls, however. An overly ambi-
tious President could frustrate legislative desires through the power to 
control all government litigation. 
Congress, of course, does not need to respond to such presidential 
intrusiveness through exemptions to Department of Justice litigating author-
ity. Statutes can be made more specific. Funding bans can limit specified 
executive initiatives. Appropriations can be cut to disfavored agencies. In 
the case of executive departments and agencies, these types of legislative 
controls should be preferred to limitations on Department of Justice litigat-
ing authority. The conferral of independent litigating authority to sub-units 
within the Executive Branch enables and encourages executive agencies 
and departments to stake out a policy position at odds with the President's. 
Statutory controls do not present this danger. Congress is the supreme law-
making branch and it is, therefore, appropriate that the President live within 
the policymaking confines of legislative delegations.395 Substantive legis-
lative directives, therefore, must be heeded by the President. Yet, once 
Congress has granted discretion to the Executive Branch to put into place 
broadly phrased legislative mandates, it is appropriate that some centraliz-
ing force under the President's direct control define the meaning of such 
legislative delegations. 
Congress would be well served by systematically thinking through the 
independent litigating authority issue. In the end, it may prefer the current 
system where independent agency decisionmaking can be overturned by the 
Executive Branch. Alternatively, it may prefer to draw cleaner lines sepa-
rating independent agencies from executive entities. Whatever conclusion 
it reaches, however, Congress should not place the Solicitor General in too 
exalted a position. If an independent agency voice is to be spoken, Solicitor 
General control can and should be limited. Otherwise, the Solicitor General 
392. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 54 (emphasis added). 
393. Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 519, 530 (1987); see also Thomas 0. 
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 449 
(1987). 
394. See McGarity, supra note 393, at 447-48; The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, 
supra note 49, at 54. 
395. See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: 
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 
203, 228-42 (1987). 
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will sometimes thwart that voice. It is this aspect of Solicitor General 
control that is in need of repair.396 
Although change is necessary, it need not require a diminution of 
Solicitor General control in favor of independent agency autonomy. The 
subordination of independent agency decisionmaking to Executive Branch 
control offers another type of change. The limited and unsuccessful efforts 
of some Reagan and Bush Administration officials to push the unitariness 
banner,397 however, reveal that subordinating independent agencies to a 
unitary executive is an idea whose time is yet to come. 
With that bit of political reality in mind, this Article has focused on the 
day-to-day interchanges between the Solicitor General and the independent 
agencies. The solution proposed in this Article is to allow independent 
agency self-representation whenever the Solicitor General is unwilling to 
advocate the agency's interests. This solution, as the FTC experience 
reveals, would greatly benefit independent agencies with little harm to the 
Solicitor General. Moreover, especially if Congress makes the Solicitor 
General a statutory litigant in all cases involving the government, this 
hybrid model would enable the Supreme Court to continue reaping the ben-
efits of Solicitor General counsel. 
The hybrid model is also sensitive to the culture of expectations sur-
rounding Solicitor General advocacy. Congress, hesitant to extend 
independent litigating authority beyond federal courts of appeals, clearly 
prefers a unitary governmental voice before the Supreme Court. In 
exchange for this grant of authority, however, Congress expects that the 
Solicitor General will be a responsible gatekeeper and an "objective advo-
cate" who seriously considers the merits of independent agency arguments. 
Most Solicitors General, like Congress, seem comfortable with this mixed 
approach. Certiorari is more likely to be sought in independent agency 
cases than in cases involving purely executive offices. The flagging of 
independent agency-Solicitor General disagreements in briefs and certiorari 
petitions likewise is common. Finally, independent agencies are sometimes 
allowed to separately advance their views to the Court. These accommoda-
tions reveal a willingness on the part of most Solicitors General to give up 
some unitariness in independent agency cases. 
The hybrid model, moreover, is sensitive to the twin and somewhat 
contradictory goals of unitariness and independence. First, the hybrid 
model does not undermine Solicitor General authority. Under it, the 
Solicitor General is the presumptive government advocate before the 
Supreme Court. As such, independent agencies recognizing the benefits of 
396. For this reason, I reject Todd Lochner's proposal to preserve the Solicitor General's absolute 
control over certiorari petitions and government advocacy before the Court but to allow independent 
agencies an ''unqualified right to file an amicus brief in any case iu which its interests were directly 
affected." Lochner, supra note 176, at 580. 
397. See generally Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the lAw, supra note 1. 
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Solicitor General representation would typically heed Solicitor General rec-
ommendations. At the same time, knowing that an independent agency 
may seek self-representation, the Solicitor General would be attentive to 
independent agency desires in order to maximize control of government 
litigation. Second, when conflicts emerge between the Solicitor General 
and independent agencies, the hybrid model does not stifle the interests of 
either advocate. Independent agencies gain the right to ensure that their 
views are fairly presented to the Court. The Solicitor General, while no 
longer possessing the authority to influence the Court's agenda by denying 
a forum to disfavored independent agency litigants, could nonetheless par-
ticipate as a statutory litigant in all independent agency cases. Additionally, 
by being free of the pressure to sometimes advocate independent agency 
positions as a matter of comity, the Solicitor General may gain from this 
arrangement. 
The hybrid model would be an improvement, but it is far from a pan-
acea. In some instances, a singular governmental position should be 
presented to the Court. For example, statutes that cut across all governmen-
tal operations, such as the Freedom of Information Act, should not be sub-
ject to myriad conflicting interpretations. In other instances, the risk that an 
independent agency might be subject to interest group capture may prove so 
acute that Solicitor General control appears the lesser of two evils. To take 
into account the possibility that plenary Solicitor General control over 
independent agency litigation is sometimes sensible, the hybrid model must 
give way when a convincing case can be made for Executive Branch 
control. Furthermore, although responsive to instances where the Solicitor 
General thwarts independent agency prerogatives, the hybrid model cannot 
prevent a renegade independent agency from either routinely disregarding 
Solicitor General input or insistently seeking certiorari after each appellate 
court defeat. This risk, however, does not warrant Solicitor General control 
of independent agency litigation. 
Between the dangers of too strong a Solicitor General or too persistent 
an independent agency there is no choice. A principal rationale for 
independent agencies is to make policy judgments free of executive control. 
Consequently, while an overly aggressive independent agency may prove a 
nuisance to an already overburdened Supreme Court, a Solicitor General 
who is too strong poses a real threat to the structural division between 
independent agencies and the Executive Branch. Unless and until the pur-
poses. of independent agency autonomy change, the Solicitor General 
should not control independent agency litigation. To argue otherwise, that 
the Solicitor General should maintain dominion over independent agency 
litigation, is to argue against the propriety of independent agencies being 
truly independent; as this Article demonstrates, unitariness is the only 
mooring which supports Solicitor General control of independent agency 
litigation. 
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Unitariness, of course, is not without appeal. But unitariness cannot be 
reconciled with independent agency autonomy. Although unitariness and 
independence may peacefully coexist under the hybrid model, unitariness 
nonetheless will occasionally give way to dual governmental presentations. 
For those who find dual governmental presentations before the Supreme 
Court unseemly and inappropriate, the current model of Solicitor General 
control is generally satisfactory. The issue of dual presentations before 
lower federal courts, however, must also be confronted. Supporters of a 
unitary Solicitor General should oppose this system of independent agency 
autonomy before lower courts as well. Since unitariness is the only value 
which supports Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation, 
there is no reason to think it somehow matters less in lower court adjudica-
tion where nearly all independent agency litigation is resolved. 
Proponents of the current scheme cannot have it both ways. 
Unitariness before the Supreme Court suggests unitariness before all courts. 
Independence before lower federal courts implies the right to speak one's 
voice before the Supreme Court. Unitariness and independence are values 
in tension. A choice between values must be made. That choice, whatever 
it may be, requires change. 
